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Preface
Text analytics technologies are being widely used as components in Big Data applications, allowing
for the extraction of different types of information from large volumes of text. A growing number
of research efforts is now investigating the applicability of these techniques for cybersecurity pur-
poses. Many applications are using text analytics techniques to provide a safer online experience, by
detecting unwanted content and behavior on the Internet. Other text analytics approaches attempt to
detect illegal activity on online networks or monitor social media against the background of real-life
threats. Alongside this quest, many ethical concerns arise, such as privacy issues and the potential
abuse of such technology. The first workshop on Text Analytics for Cybersecurity and Online Safety
(TA-COS 2016) aims to bring together researchers that have an active interest in the development and
application of such tools.
Following our call for papers, we received papers on a wide range of topics and with the help of
our varied team of reviewers were able to select the most relevant and most interesting contributions.
The first two papers that are presented at this workshop deal with the issue of identifying hate speech
on social media. Saleem and colleagues describe a technique that automatically detects hateful com-
munities, while Tulkens et al. present research on how to develop techniques that idenfity hateful
words and phrases on social media.
In the second session of this workshop Opesada et al. present a study on the origin of 419 Scam
e-mails, using text classification techniques that identify varieties of English. Killam et al. identify
malware on the Android platform by using text analytics on the apps’ binary files. Finally, Wilson
et al. describe work on developing techniques that can aid people in understanding the often lengthy
and complex terms of use that they agree to online.
We are very pleased with this wide variety of topics of the submitted papers and are furthermore
very pleased to be able to kick off our workshop with a keynote lecture by Anna Vartapetiance of the
University of Surrey’s Centre for Cyber Security. She will present ongoing research on the automatic
detection of online grooming. We are sure that the presentations at TA-COS 2016 will trigger fruitful
discussions and will help foster the awareness of the increasingly important role text analytics can
play in cybersecurity applications.
The TA-COS 2016 Organizers,
Guy De Pauw
Ben Verhoeven
Bart Desmet
Els Lefever
www.ta-cos.org
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A Web of Hate: Tackling Hateful Speech in Online Social Spaces
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Abstract
Online social platforms are beset with hateful speech - content that expresses hatred for a person or group of people. Such content
can frighten, intimidate, or silence platform users, and some of it can inspire other users to commit violence. Despite widespread
recognition of the problems posed by such content, reliable solutions even for detecting hateful speech are lacking. In the present work,
we establish why keyword-based methods are insufficient for detection. We then propose an approach to detecting hateful speech that
uses content produced by self-identifying hateful communities as training data. Our approach bypasses the expensive annotation process
often required to train keyword systems and performs well across several established platforms, making substantial improvements over
current state-of-the-art approaches.
Keywords: Hate speech, social media, text classification
1. Introduction
Online spaces are often exploited and misused to spread
content that can be degrading, abusive, or otherwise harm-
ful to people. An important and elusive form of such lan-
guage is hateful speech: content that expresses hatred of a
group in society.
Hateful speech has become a major problem for every kind
of online platform where user-generated content appears:
from the comment sections of news websites to real-time
chat sessions in immersive games. Such content can alien-
ate users and can also support radicalization and incite vio-
lence (Allan, 2013). Platform operators recognize that hate-
ful content poses both practical and ethical issues and many,
including Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and gaming compa-
nies such as Riot Games, have tried to discourage it, by
altered their platforms or policies.
Yet reliable solutions for online hateful speech are lacking.
Currently, platforms predominantly rely on users to report
objectionable content. This requires labor-intensive review
by platform staff and can also entirely miss hateful or harm-
ful speech that is not reported. With the high volume of
content being generated on major platforms, an accurate
automated method might be a useful step towards dimin-
ishing the effects of hateful speech.
Without exception, state-of-the-art computational ap-
proaches rely upon either human annotation or manually
curated lists of offensive terms to train classifiers (Kwok
and Wang, 2013; Ting et al., 2013). Recent work has shown
that human annotators tasked with labeling hate speech
have significant difficulty achieving reasonable inter-coder
reliability (Kwok and Wang, 2013). Within industry, it is
generally acknowledged that keyword lists are also insuf-
ficient for accurate detection of hateful speech. However,
little work has been done to understand the nature of their
limitations and to design able alternative approaches. This
is the topic of the present work.
This paper makes three key contributions. First, we estab-
lish why the problem of hateful speech detection is diffi-
cult, identifying factors that lead to the poor performance of
keyword-based approaches. Second, we propose a new ap-
proach to hateful speech detection, leveraging online com-
munities as a source of language models. Third, we show
that such a model can perform well both within a platform
and across platforms — a feature we believe we are the first
to achieve.
We are also aware that automated detection of online
speech could be misused to suppress constructive and/or
dissenting voices by directing the system at individuals or
groups that are not dedicated to expressing hatred. Such a
use would be antithetical to our intent, which is to explore
and illustrate ways in which computational techniques can
provide opportunities to observe and contain harmful con-
tent online, without impinging on the freedom to speak
openly, and even to express unpalatable or unpopular views.
We hope that our work can help diminish hatred and harm
online. Furthermore, since our method can be trained on
and applied to a wide array of online platforms, this work
may help to inform the direction of future research in this
area.
2. Background
Hate and hateful speech. Legal and academic literature
generally defines hate speech as speech (or any form of ex-
pression) that expresses (or seeks to promote, or has the
capacity to increase) hatred against a person or group of
people because of a characteristic they share, or a group
to which they belong (Mendel et al., 2012). There is no
consensus definition, however. Definitions of this sort are
problematic for a number of reasons (Bartlett et al., 2014),
including that hate speech is defined by prevailing social
norms, context, and individual and collective interpretation.
This makes it difficult to identify hate speech consistently
and yields the paradox (also observed with pornography)
that each person seems to have an intuition for what hate
speech is, but rarely are two people’s understandings the
same. This claim is affirmed by a recent study that demon-
strated a mere 33% agreement between coders from differ-
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ent races, when tasked to identify racist tweets (Kwok and
Wang, 2013).
A particular ambiguity in the term ‘hate speech’ is in “hate”
itself. That word might refer to the speaker/author’s hatred,
or his/her desire to make the targets of the speech feel hated,
or desire to make others hate the target(s), or the apparent
capacity of the speech to increase hatred. Needless to say,
we require a rigorous — and formal — definition of a type
of speech if we are to automate its detection.
Our initial motivation was to find, and work with, a notion
of hate speech that can be operationalised. The work of on-
line platform operators (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, and Red-
dit) helped to focus this aim. Their concern over the capac-
ity of language to do harm — whether emotional, mental,
or physical — logically focuses more on what is expressed
rather than how it is intended. Whereas “hate speech” can
imply an inquiry or judgment about intent (e.g. what was
this person feeling or wishing?), we propose the term “hate-
ful speech” to focus on the expression of hate — a nuanced,
but useful distinction since expression is easier to detect
than intent, and more likely to be linked to language’s ca-
pacity to cause harm.
This leads to our term hateful speech: speech which
contains an expression of hatred on the part of the
speaker/author, against a person or people, based on their
group identity.
Hateful speech is not to be mistaken for ”cyber-bullying,”
another form of troubling online content that has been
widely discussed and studied in recent literature. Cyber-
bullying is repetitive, intentional, aggressive behavior
against an individual, and it either creates or maintains a
power imbalance between aggressor and target (Tokunaga,
2010). It is often hateful but it does not necessarily den-
igrate a person based on his or her membership in a par-
ticular group, as hateful speech (the subject of the present
work) does.
Community-defined speech. As we will discuss in detail
later, we use the language that emerges from self-organized
communities (in Reddit and elsewhere) as the basis for our
models of hateful speech. Our decision is based on a deep
sociological literature that acknowledges that communities
both form, and are formed by, coherent linguistic prac-
tices (Bucholtz and Hall, 2005). Most groups are defined
in part by the “relationships between language choice and
rules of social appropriateness” forming speech communi-
ties (Gumperz, 2009). In this way of thinking, the group is
defined by the speech and the speech comes to define the
group (Klein et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 1995; Spears and
Lea, 1992; Spears and Lea, 1994).
In the context of this study, this means that hate groups and
the hateful speech they deploy towards their target com-
munity cannot exist without one another, especially online.
Therefore, taking the linguistic attributes particular to a
community committed to degrading a specific group is a le-
gitimate and principled way of defining a particular form of
hateful speech. To our knowledge, this work represents the
first effort to explicitly leverage a community-based classi-
fication of hateful language.
Existing approaches to detecting hateful speech. De-
spite widespread concern about hateful speech online, to
our knowledge there have been only three distinct lines
of work on the problem of automated detection of hateful
speech. One study concerned the detection of racism us-
ing a Naive Bayes classifier (Kwok and Wang, 2013). This
work established the definitional challenge of hate speech
by showing annotators could agree only 33% of the time
on texts purported to contain hate speech. Another con-
sidered the problem of detecting anti-Semitic comments in
Yahoo news groups using support vector machines (Warner
and Hirschberg, 2012). Notably, the training data for this
classifier was hand-coded. As we will discuss in this pa-
per, manually annotated training data admits the potential
for hard-to-trace bias in the speech ultimately detected. A
third study used a linguistic rule-based approach on tweets
that had been collected using offensive keywords (Xiang et
al., 2012). Like manually annotated data, keyword-based
data has significant biasing effects as well.
In this work we aim to build on these studies in two ways.
First, we will consider a definition of hateful speech that
could be practically useful to platform operators. Second,
we will develop a general method for the detection of hate-
ful speech that does not depend on manually annotated or
keyword-collected data.
Reddit and other online sources of hateful speech.
Reddit is currently one of the most actively used social
content aggregation platforms. It is used for entertain-
ment, news and social discussions. Registered users can
post and comment on content in relevant community dis-
cussion spaces called subreddits. While the vast majority
of content that passes through Reddit is civil, multiple sub-
reddits have emerged with the explicit purpose of posting
and sharing hateful content, for example, r/CoonTown,
r/FatPeopleHate, r/beatingwomen; all which
have been recently banned under Reddit’s user-harassment
policy (Moreno et al., 2015). There are also subreddits ded-
icated to supporting communities that are the targets of hate
speech.
Reddit is an attractive testbed for work on hateful speech
both because the community spaces are well-defined (i.e.,
they have names, complete histories of threaded discus-
sions) and because, until recently, Reddit has been a major
online home for both hateful speech communities and sup-
porters for their target groups. For these reasons, through-
out this paper, our analyses heavily leverage data from Red-
dit groups.
Of course, Reddit is not the sole platform for hateful
speech. Voat, a recently created competitor to Reddit, along
with a vibrant ecosystem of other social content aggrega-
tion platforms, provide online spaces for topical discussion
communities, hate groups among them. Furthermore, ded-
icated websites and social networking sites such as Twitter
and Facebook are also reservoirs of easily accessible hate-
ful speech.
Important research has investigated the effects of racist
speech (Nakamura, 2009) and sexual harassment (Fox and
Tang, 2014) in online games. Notably, in this study we
have not worked with data from online gaming platforms,
primarily because the platforms are generally closed to con-
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Target Hate # of Support # of
Group subreddit comments subreddit comments
Black CoonTown 350851 Racism 9778
Plus FPH 1577681 LoseIt 658515
Female TRP 51504 TwoXCr 66390
Table 1: Public comments collected from hate and sup-
port subreddits on Reddit, for three target groups. (FPH:
FatPeopleHate, TRP: TheRedPill, TwoXcr: TwoXChromo-
somes)
ventional data collection methods.
3. The limits of keyword-based approaches
In the same way that hateful groups have defining speech
patterns, communities that consist of the targets of hate-
ful speech also have characteristic language conventions.
We will loosely call these support groups. Notably, sup-
port groups and the groups that espouse hateful speech
about them often engage in discourse on similar topics,
albeit with very different intent. Fat-shaming groups and
plus-size communities both discuss issues associated with
high BMI, and women and misogynists both discuss gen-
der equity. This topical overlap can create opportunities for
shared vocabulary that may confuse classifiers.
In addition, many keyword-based approaches select estab-
lished and widely known slurs and offensive terms that are
used to target specific groups. While such keywords will
certainly catch some hateful speech, it is common to ex-
press hate in less explicit terms, without resorting to stan-
dard slurs and other offensive terms.
For example, hateful speakers refer to migrants and
refugees as “parasites” and call African-Americans “ani-
mals.” While neither of these terms are inherently hateful,
in context they strongly denigrate the group to which each
term is applied.
We can expect that classifiers trained on overtly hateful
keywords will miss such posts that use more nuanced or
context-dependent ways of achieving hateful speech.
Furthermore, keywords can be also be obscured through
misspelings, character substitutions (by using symbols as
letters), using homophones etc. These practices are com-
monly employed to circumvent keyword-based filters on
online platforms (Warner and Hirschberg, 2012).
In this section, we study the potential impact of topic over-
lap on data returned by keyword-based queries (we will
consider under-sampling issues in the next section). Here
our focus will be on the sample that keyword-based fil-
ters return and in later sections we will consider the per-
formance of classifiers built from such samples.
Data. Recently, Reddit user, Stuck In the Matrix1,
made available large data dumps that contain a majority
of the content (posts and comments) generated on Reddit2.
The data dumps, collected using the Reddit API, are orga-
nized by month and year. The data date back to 2006 and
are regularly updated with new content. We use all com-
1https://www.reddit.com/user/Stuck In the Matrix/
2http://couch.whatbox.ca:36975/reddit/
Black Plus-size Female
Coon- racism FPH loseit TRP TwoXCr
Town
nigger white weight weight women time
white racism calorie calorie girl women
black black time time time feel
shit racist work food woman work
time race food eating shit year
fucking time feel week work fuck
fuck person eating work year shit
race point week feel life weight
year feel lose lose fuck fucking
hate comment year diet guy person
racist american women body point life
live post diet exercise friend girl
work issue body goal post love
jew asian start loss feel pretty
crime color goal year fucking food
Jaccard Index: 0.28 JI: 0.76 JI: 0.50
Table 2: Top discovered topics from support and hate sub-
reddits for the three targets. The bold terms signify those
that are present in both the hate and support vocabulary.
ments from January 2006 through January 31, 2016 and ex-
panded the dataset with each update. Each file corresponds
to a month of Reddit data, and every line is a json object of
a Reddit comment or post.
For our analysis, we identify three commonly targeted
groups on Reddit — African-American (black), plus-sized
(plus) and women. For each of the target groups, we se-
lect the most active support and hate subreddits. To create
our datasets, we extract all user comments in the selected
subreddits from the data dumps described above, in Octo-
ber 2015. The details on the selected subreddits and the
number of the extracted comments are provided in Table 1.
Methods. For each of the selected subreddits, we use la-
beled Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LLDA) to learn the top-
ics that characterize them, against a baseline Reddit lan-
guage. This baseline is intended to push the LLDA to re-
move non-topical vocabulary from the two subreddit top-
ics; it consists of a sample of 460,000 comments taken at
random from the Reddit data scrape (none of the posts be-
longed to any of the subreddits of interest). Prior to topic
modeling, stop words, punctuation, URLs, and digits were
stripped from the comments and for the purpose of bal-
anced analysis, an equal number of comments was selected
from the subreddit and the random sample. We use JGib-
bLDA for the topic inference (Phan and Nguyen, 2006).
Results. In Table 2, we present the 15 most topical words
from each subreddit. The top terms in the topics are consis-
tent with the target/support communities. For example, the
term “women” was ranked highly in subreddits that con-
cern women (whether positively or negatively referenced)
and “weight” is the highest ranked topic for subreddits dis-
cussing plus-sized individuals and lifestyle.
We observe a substantial overlap in vocabulary of hate and
support subreddits, across all three target communities (see
bold words in Table 2). While in the case of a black target
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group, we observe a Jaccard Index (JI) of 0.28, the overlap
is higher in the case of female targets with JI at 0.50 and
much higher for plus-size targets, with a JI of 0.76.
The implication of this shared vocabulary is that while key-
words can be used to detect text relevant to the target,
they are not optimal for detecting targeted hateful speech.
Shared vocabulary increases the likelihood of tagging con-
tent that is related to the target but not necessarily hateful,
as hateful and increases false positives. We therefore re-
quire more robust training data.
4. A community-driven model of hateful
speech
A key objective of our research is to avoid the issues associ-
ated with using manual annotation and keyword searches to
produce training data for a classifier. As noted previously,
sociological literature acknowledges that communities are
formed by coherent linguistic practices and are defined, in
part, by their linguistic identity (Gumperz, 2009). Thus,
the opportunity considered here is to leverage the linguis-
tic practices of specific online communities to empirically
define a particular kind of hateful speech.
Since linguistic practices coincide with the identity of a
community using them, we can define hateful speech as dis-
course practiced by communities who self-identify as hate-
ful towards a target group. The members of the community
contribute to the denigration of the target and, therefore,
share a common linguistic identity. This allows us to de-
velop a language model of hateful speech directly from the
linguistic conventions of that community without requiring
manual annotation of specific passages or keyword-based
searches. This approach has a number of advantages over
these practices.
First, a community-based definition removes the interpre-
tive challenge involved in manual annotation. Membership
in a self-organized community that is committed to deni-
gration of a target group through the hatred of others is an
observable attribute we can use to surface hateful speech
events.
Second, unlike prior work, our method does not require a
keyword list. We identify communities that conform to the
linguistic identity of a self-organized hateful groups and use
such communities to collect data. This data is used to learn
the language model around the linguistic identity for detec-
tion. This removes any biases implicit in the construction
of a keyword list (i.e., in the words included in or excluded
from the list).
Third, a community-based definition provides a large vol-
ume of high quality, current, labeled data for training and
then subsequent testing of classifiers. Such large datasets
have traditionally been difficult to collect due to depen-
dence on either manual annotation (annotation is slow and
costly) or keyword searches (stringent keywords may turn
up relatively few hits).
This approach generalizes to other online environments
(such as Voat and other hateful speech-focused web fo-
rums) in which communities declare their identities, in-
tentions, and organize their discussions. Any online (or,
even, offline) communication forum in which all partici-
pants gather for the understood purpose of degrading a tar-
get group constitutes a valid source of training data.
In the following subsections, this approach is validated
through three analyses. First, we demonstrate that the hate
speech communities identified actually employ distinct lin-
guistic practices: we show that our method can reliably dis-
tinguish content of a hateful speech community from the
rest of Reddit. We also show that our approach substan-
tially outperforms systems built on data collected through
keywords.
Second, we show that our approach is sensitive to the lin-
guistic differences between the language of hateful and sup-
port communities. This task is notably difficult given the
results we reported above, showing that such communities
share many high-frequency words.
Finally, we use our Reddit-trained classifier to detect hate-
ful speech on other (non-Reddit) platforms: on Voat and
hateful speech web forums (websites devoted to discus-
sion threads attacking or denigrating a target community).
For both, we find that our method performs better than a
keyword-based baseline.
4.1. Data collection
Reddit. We use Reddit as the primary source for the
hateful communities and leverage the linguistic practices
of these communities to empirically define and develop
language models for target-specific hateful speech. In
all three of our studies, we focus on the aforementioned
three target groups: black people, plus-sized individuals,
and women. For each, we select the most active hateful
and support subreddits and collect all the publicly avail-
able comments present in the data dumps provided by
Stuck In the Matrix. The details on the dataset are
provided in Table 1. We also collect a random sample of
460,000 Reddit comments to serve as negative examples.
Voat. Voat, a content aggregator similar to Reddit, also
hosts active discussion communities, called subverses, few
of which identify as hateful. We select Voat because of
its similarity to our original source3. Since the two web-
sites cater to a similar user-base, the generated linguistic
identities should be similar in sub-communities with simi-
lar themes. Therefore, the language model of hateful com-
munities on Reddit should match, to an extent, with the lan-
guage model of similar hateful communities on Voat.
For the three target groups, we identify hateful sub-
verses — v/CoonTown, v/fatpeoplehate and
v/TheRedPill — sub-communities that share their
name with their counterparts on Reddit and target blacks,
plus-size individuals, and women, respectively. In the ab-
sence of an API, we use web-scraping libraries to retrieve
all publicly available comments posted to the selected sub-
verses between July 2015 and January 2016. We also col-
lect a set of 50,000 comments (from the same time period)
from a random sample of subverses to serve as negative ex-
amples (Table 3).
Web forums. We also use stand-alone web forums that
are dedicated to expressing hate or contempt for the target
communities. These web forums are social platforms that
3http://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/07/09/what-is-voat-the-
site-reddit-users-are-flocking-to/
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Target Subverse Voat Website Comments
Black CoonTown 3358 shitskin 3160
Plus fatpeoplehate 31717 -
Female TheRedPill 478 mgtowhq 20688
Table 3: Target-relevant hateful comments collected from
Voat subverses and web forums.
provide their users with discussion boards, where users can
create threads under predefined topics and other users can
then add comments in these threads. We, therefore, select
web forums for their discussion-based communities and
user-generated content. Again, due to the lack of APIs, we
use, as data, comments that were collected by web-scraping
libraries from numerous threads of their discussion boards
during October 2015.
For the black target group, we use Shitskin.com: our
dataset consists of 3,160 comments posted to 558 threads
from three of website’s boards: “Primal Instinct”, “Crackin
the whip!” and “Underground Railroad.” For the female
target group, we use mgtowhq.com: this dataset consists
of 20688 comments posted to 4,597 threads from the “MG-
TOW General Discussion” board. Finally, as a source of
negative examples, we use the “random” discussion board
on topix.com: this dataset consists of nearly 21,000
comments from 2458 threads. To our knowledge, no large
fat-shaming forum exists, thus we do not include this target
group in this phase of the study (Table 3). All comments
have posting times between July 2015 and January 2016.
4.2. Methods
Before the classification process, we preprocess all the data
by eliminating URLs, stopwords, numerals and punctua-
tions. We further lowercase the text and remove platform-
relevant noise (e.g., comments from house keeping bots on
Reddit like AutoModerator). The text is finally tokenized
and used as input for the classification pipeline.
We use multiple machine learning algorithms to generate
the language models of hateful communities. From the
analysis of the prior work, we identify the commonly-used
algorithms and employ them in our analysis. Specifically,
we use naive Bayes (NB), support vector machines (SVM)
and logistic regression (LR). We do this in order to assess
the merits of our insight into using community-defined data
collection.
The algorithms take as input, tokenized and preprocessed
arrays of user comments along with the label of the com-
munity they belong to. We use a sparse representation of
unigrams with tfidf weights as our feature set. In future in-
vestigation, we would like to add part of speech tags and
sentiment score as features.
For performance evaluation, we use the standard measures:
accuracy, precision, recall and F1-Score. We also use Co-
hen’s κ as a measure of agreement between the observed
and expected labels. κ helps in evaluating the prediction
performance of classifiers by taking in account any chance
agreement between the labels.
Baseline comparison. Our aim is to assess the impact of
using community-based text compared with keyword-based
text as training data. Due to space limitations, here we re-
port only a logistic regression classifier trained on keyword-
collected data (SVM and NB showed comparable perfor-
mance).
The specific keywords used are generated from the com-
ments collected from hateful Reddit communities. For a
given target group, we generate three sets of keywords for
each: (1) keywords generated between hate subreddits and
a random sample of Reddit comments using LLDA, as in
Section 3, (2) keywords generated between hate subred-
dits and a random sample of Reddit comments using χ2
weights (χ2I), and (3) keywords generated between hate
and support subreddits using χ2 weights (χ2II). To gener-
ate the training datasets, we use the top 30 keywords and
from a separate random sample of Reddit comments, col-
lect samples that contain at least one of the keywords as
positive samples and samples that contain no keywords as
negative samples. For each keyword type and each target,
we aggregate 50,000 positive and 50,000 negative samples
for training.
4.3. Results and Discussion
Community language vs. hateful speech. It may seem
that, by comparing classifiers on the task of detecting hate-
ful community posts, we are equating language produced
by a hateful community with hateful language. Certainly,
they are not always the same. Some content is likely non-
hateful chatter. One alternative for excluding such noise
is manual coding of testing data. Given the existing is-
sues with such labeled data, we avoid such manual label-
ing. Furthermore, a comparison of the two approaches is
not fair due to the associated trade-offs. The community
definition, as mentioned, relies on the assumption that all
the content in a hateful community is hateful, which might
not always be true. However, such an assumption allows
us to generate large training datasets with relative ease. We
therefore allow the presence of some noise in the training
data for ease of training data generation and favouring re-
call. On the other hand, manual annotation promises less
noisy datasets at the expense of time and resources, which
limits the size of training datasets. It would be very labo-
rious to produce datasets as large as those generated with
our community approach. Also, since manual annotation
relies heavily on personal perception, it can also introduce
noise in the datasets. In other words, manual annotation
does not allow us to generate large training sets, and also
cannot provide completely noise-free data.
Another option, however, is to focus on the precision
( TPTP+FP ) of the classifier. Precision indicates the classi-
fier’s ability to identify only content from the hateful com-
munity. The construction of the test datasets is such that
hateful speech should only exist in the hateful community
posts. Thus, a method that detects hateful content should
strongly favor including only content from hateful commu-
nities — yielding high precision. Crucially, in the discus-
sions that follow, we find that a community-based classifier
demonstrates much higher precision than keyword-based
methods. Thus, by either measure (F1 or precision), our
community-based classifier outperforms the baselines.
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(a) Assessing the distinct nature of language emerging from hate groups.
Target Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score Cohen’s κ
NB SVM LR NB SVM LR NB SVM LR NB SVM LR NB SVM LR
Black 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.74 0.73 0.8 0.79 0.79 0.58 0.61 0.61
Plus 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.56 0.57 0.57
Female 0.77 0.8 0.81 0.71 0.81 0.84 0.9 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.55 0.6 0.61
(b) Assessing sensitivity between the language of hate and support groups.
Black 0.8 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.85 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.57 0.56 0.55
Plus 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.66 0.69 0.7
Female 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.8 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.57 0.56 0.57
Table 4: The performance of the three classification algorithms across the three target groups, with a 10 fold cross-
validation. (a) Hateful comments are classified against random comments. (b) Hateful comments are classified against
comments from support communities. In both cases, the classifier is able to distinguish hate speech from negative cases.
(NB: Naive Bayes, SVM: Support Vector Machines, LR: Logistic Regression)
(a) Baseline performance over Reddit data.
Target Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score Cohen’s κ
LDA χ2I χ2II LDA χ2I χ2II LDA χ2I χ2II LDA χ2I χ2II LDA χ2I χ2II
Black 0.59 0.63 0.57 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.44 0.4 0.56 0.54 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.15
Plus 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.6 0.55 0.35 0.4 0.34 0.42 0.48 0.42 0.06 0.14 0.06
Female 0.68 0.7 0.7 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.6 0.68 0.7 0.66 0.35 0.40 0.4
(b) Baseline performance over Voat data.
Black 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.73 0.68 0.48 0.4 0.4 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.24 0.26 0.23
Plus 0.56 0.6 0.57 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.35 0.4 0.36 0.43 0.5 0.45 0.11 0.2 0.14
Female 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.63 0.63 0.5 0.65 0.67 0.6 0.35 0.38 0.34
(c) Baseline performance over web forum data.
Black 0.66 0.62 0.57 0.72 0.77 0.67 0.53 0.35 0.31 0.61 0.48 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.15
Female 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.75 0.74 0.64 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.56 0.58 0.54
Table 5: We calculate the baseline performance on multiple platforms with three keyword-generating methods: LDA, χ2I
and χ2II. Classification was done using logistic regression.
Target Acc Pre Rec F1 κ
Voat
Black 0.82 0.87 0.74 0.80 0.64
Plus 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.62
Female 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.49
Websites
Black 0.82 0.87 0.77 0.82 0.65
Female 0.77 0.83 0.69 0.75 0.54
Table 6: For our targets, we collect comments from hateful
communities on Voat and web forums and test the perfor-
mance of language models learned from Reddit communi-
ties.
Hateful groups have distinct linguistic signatures. In
Table 4(a), we see the performance of the three classifiers
when classifying a balanced corpus of hateful posts and
randomly selected (non-hateful speech) Reddit posts with
10-fold cross validation. The dataset consists of all the
comments collected from the relevant hate subreddit (Table
1) as positive samples and an equal number of random Red-
dit comments as negative samples. We observe the three
Training Testing Acc Pre Rec F1 κ
CT FPH 0.58 0.72 0.26 0.38 0.15
CT TRP 0.55 0.6 0.22 0.32 0.08
FPH TRP 0.58 0.65 0.3 0.41 0.15
FPH CT 0.54 0.61 0.23 0.34 0.08
TRP CT 0.51 0.53 0.28 0.36 0.03
TRP FPH 0.6 0.65 0.41 0.51 0.19
Table 7: We test the performance of classification systems
built on data that belongs to a target community differnt
than the one we test on. (CT: CoonTown)
classifiers perform almost identically. Naive Bayes slightly
outperforms others on Recall and F1-score, while Logistic
Regression is a slightly better performer on the other met-
rics. Also, the performance of the classifiers is consistent
across the three target groups. Analysis of κ suggests that
observed labels after the classification process are in mod-
erate to substantial agreement with the expected labels.
Comparison to baseline. In all cases considered, a
classifier trained on community-based data outperforms a
keyword-based classifier. Notably, the keyword-based clas-
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sifier for the women-target group performed best, suggest-
ing that hateful community language associated with the
keywords used for collection are more representative of
hateful speech (compared to other communities).
From a precision perspective, we find that the community-
based classifier outperforms the baselines by between 10%
and 20%, indicating that the community-based classifier is
including far fewer incorrect cases of hateful speech (false
positives). When we look at the true positive posts that have
been detected exclusively by the community-based classi-
fier (i.e., that the keyword-based approach missed), we find
many that are clearly hateful, but in ways that do not use
specialized slurs. Several examples from the CoonTown
subreddit:
1. “I don’t see the problem here. Animals attack other
animals all the time.”
2. “Oy vey my grandparents vuz gassed ven dey vaz six
years old!”
3. “DNA is rayciss, or didn’t you know?”
4. “Are they going to burn their own town again? Yawn.”
These examples characterize different (and important)
ways in which speech can be hateful without using words
that typically operate, largely independent of context, as
slurs. In Example 1, African-Americans are described as
animals, employing a word that is not usually a slur, to
denigrate them. In Example 2, historical context (the gas
chambers in Nazi concentration camps), culturally stereo-
typed language (“Oy vey”), and spelling to imitate an ac-
cent (“ven dey vaz”) are successfully used to express con-
tempt and hatred, without any slur or even any word that,
like ’animals’ in the first example, is sometimes pressed
into service as a slur. The third example, like the sec-
ond, parodies an accent, and here it is notable that while
“racist” might be a keyword use for collection, it’s unlikely
that “rayciss” would be used. Finally Example 4 achieves
its effect by attacking a group through an implication of
stereotyped action without even actually naming them at all
(as opposed to Example 1, in which the targets were called
“animals”).
Community-based approach is sensitive to the linguistic
differences of hate and support communities. In Sec-
tion 3, we showed that hateful and support communities
for a target group have a shared vocabulary: the two com-
munities often engage in discourse on similar topics, albeit
with quite different intent. Since the shared keywords are
not effective in the discrimination process, recognizing the
distinction between hate and support communities can be
challenging. We set up a classification task for identify-
ing comments from support and hate communities, carried
out with a 10-fold cross-validation. The performance of the
task is presented in Table 4(b). We observe that this perfor-
mance is close to the performance of our system against a
random collection of Reddit comments (Table 4(a)). There-
fore, even with shared vocabulary, our system is sensitive
to the distinction in linguistic characteristics of hateful and
support communities for the same target.
Community-trained systems can be deployed on other
platforms. Often training data for hateful language clas-
sification can be hard to obtain on specific platforms. For
this reason, methods that work across platforms (trained on
one platform, applied on another platform) present signifi-
cant advantages.
For the analysis, we continue with the same three target
groups and train our language model, using logistic re-
gression, with comments from relevant Reddit communi-
ties and then test it on data we collected from other plat-
forms. The performance of the system, (Table 6), is very
similar to the results we obtain when testing on Reddit (Ta-
ble 4(a)). This said, we must be careful not to overstate our
method’s generalizability. While, certainly, the degree of
generalizability observed is noteworthy (particularly given
past work), these platforms all feature similar posting con-
ventions: posts are not length restricted, are made within
well defined discussion threads, and have a clear textual
context. Our method will likely perform well on any such
forum-based system. Platforms, which involve quite differ-
ent conventions, particularly those that are predominantly
populated by short-text posts (e.g., Twitter and Facebook),
will likely involve additional work. Nonetheless, we do be-
lieve that the community-based approach presents opportu-
nities for these other platforms as well.
Hateful classifiers are not target-independent. Hate-
ful conversations are thematic and major topics discovered
from conversations are target related (Table 2). Not sur-
prisingly, our system performs poorly when tested across
targets. We train the classifier on one target and test it
on another. The results (see Table 7) provide a strong in-
dication that hateful speech classification systems require
target-relevant training.
Detailed Error Analysis. In order to better understand
the performance of our system, we manually inspect a set
of erroneously classified posts from the coontown train-
ing/testing dataset. We characterize the kinds of issues we
observe and discuss them here.
Type I errors. These posts arise when non-hate group posts
are labeled as hate-group posts. Notably, we observe that
some of these errors are actually racist comments that orig-
inated from other communities in Reddit.
1. “well jeez if u pit a nigger against a cunt what do u
expect”
2. “Triskaid is a fucking nigger.”
In both of the cases the comments were in fact racist and
were therefore correctly labeled. This, of course, points
out a potential (though, we would argue minor) weakness
of our approach, which is that hate groups are not the only
source of hateful language — simply the most high-density
source.
More frequently, Type I errors featured non-racist com-
ments which had been mislabeled. This is likely due to the
fact that not all content in a hateful community is hateful:
some is simply off-topic banter among community mem-
bers. This adds noise during the training phase which mani-
fests as classification errors. While certainly an issue, given
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the dramatic improvement in overall classification perfor-
mance, we consider this an acceptable trade off at this stage
in the research. Future work should consider ways of fo-
cusing training data further on the distinctly hateful content
produced by these communities.
Type II errors. In most cases where hateful-speech com-
munity posts were incorrectly labeled as non-hateful, we
primarily find that these were, in fact, non-racist posts that
were made to the hateful subreddit. Here are a few exam-
ples:
1. “and you’re a pale virgin with a vitamin d deficiency.”
2. “Whats the deal with you 2? And besides, we’re all on
the same side here..”
3. “IP bans do literally nothing, it only takes a moment
to change it.”
4. “I can’t believe Digg is still up. I can’t believe Reddit
is still up.”
Posts like these constitute noise, in terms of our
community-based definition of hateful speech, discussed
above. Nonetheless, our system was able to correctly iden-
tify them as non-hateful. Taken together with the Type I
errors, it appears that the noise implicit in our community-
definition of hateful speech yields a modest increase in
Type I error, but can somewhat be removed by the classifier
in the form of Type II errors (which are not, in fact, errors).
A very small number of other Type II errors are examples
of hateful speech, but that target a community other than
blacks (in the cases we saw, primarily Jews):
1. “Peace and harmony? Yeah that’s why they stole that
land (now kikeriel) and killed the civilians that lived
there before. Did I mention they STILL kill the Pales-
tinians to this day and cover it up? Fuck them.”
2. “quit kissing kikeass”
3. “You sound like a jew. In a system ruled by money,
money can buy anything. Everything is capitalisms
fault. But I get why you’d support capitalism since
your “people” invented the whole shebang”
4. “Losing weight isn’t even hard, stop eating like a fuck-
ing landwhale, drink lots of water and move your fa-
tass”
Although these comments are hateful, since they are not di-
rected at black people, the system is technically performing
according to specification.
Our system missed some cases of obvious racism, such as
the following examples. However, such cases constitute
only a small fraction of the comments in Type II error.
1. “Ok Korea - you know your duty in the impending
‘blackification’ of the globe? I know where I stand”
2. “Black people are terrible. ”
3. “Pretty soon we will need a dedicated sub for black-
on-senior sexual assaults.”
4. “Who is the target audience? I would think black lit-
eracy levels would prevent “nig lit” from ever being a
viable book market.”
Overall, our analysis of Type II errors indicated that the
vast majority of mislabeled comments are not racist and are,
therefore, correctly labeled. This suggests that the actual
performance of our method is likely higher than what we
report.
Imbalanced Datasets We use balanced datasets for our
analysis. Since this assumption may or may not hold for
different data sources, we perform some initial analysis on
imbalanced datasets. As the actual composition of data
sources can be variable, we generate testing sets with the ra-
tio of hateful content to non-hateful content at 1:10, 1:100,
1:1000. Our preliminary results are similar to the perfor-
mance on a balanced test set. These results are encouraging
but require further analysis. We hope to overcome the chal-
lenges of dataset-shift due to mismatch in the composition
of testing and training datasets in future work.
5. Conclusion
The presence of hateful speech on online platforms is
a growing problem with a need for robust and scalable
solutions. In this work, we investigated the limitations
of keyword-based methods and introduced a community-
based training method as an alternative. Our work makes
two key contributions.
First, we highlight two major mechanisms that hurt the per-
formance of keyword-based methods. The shared vocabu-
lary between hateful and support communities causes train-
ing positive examples to contain non-hateful content. Also,
because keyword lists focus on more widely known slurs,
these lists miss many instances of hateful speech that use
less common or more nuanced constructions to express ha-
tred all too clearly.
Our second contribution is the idea of using self-identified
hateful communities as training data for hateful speech
classifiers. This approach both involves far less effort in
collecting training data and also produces superior classi-
fiers.
The promising results obtained in this study suggest sev-
eral opportunities for future work. Foremost is the exten-
sion of this approach to other non-forum-based platforms.
Twitter and Facebook, for example, are heavily used plat-
forms which mainly feature short-text messages. Such con-
tent presents unique challenges that will require new or
modified approaches. Another direction involves looking at
other high-signal features (syntax, n-grams, and sentiment
scores).
In these and other initiatives, we believe that community-
based data may play an essential role in producing both bet-
ter detectors of hateful speech, and a richer understanding
of the underlying phenomenon.
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Abstract
We present a dictionary-based approach to racism detection in Dutch social media comments, which were retrieved from two public
Belgian social media sites likely to attract racist reactions. These comments were labeled as racist or non-racist by multiple annotators.
For our approach, three discourse dictionaries were created: first, we created a dictionary by retrieving possibly racist and more neutral
terms from the training data, and then augmenting these with more general words to remove some bias. A second dictionary was created
through automatic expansion using a word2vec model trained on a large corpus of general Dutch text. Finally, a third dictionary
was created by manually filtering out incorrect expansions. We trained multiple Support Vector Machines, using the distribution of
words over the different categories in the dictionaries as features. The best-performing model used the manually cleaned dictionary
and obtained an F-score of 0.46 for the racist class on a test set consisting of unseen Dutch comments, retrieved from the same sites
used for the training set. The automated expansion of the dictionary only slightly boosted the model’s performance, and this increase
in performance was not statistically significant. The fact that the coverage of the expanded dictionaries did increase indicates that the
words that were automatically added did occur in the corpus, but were not able to meaningfully impact performance. The dictionaries,
code, and the procedure for requesting the corpus are available at: https://github.com/clips/hades.
Keywords:Racism, word2vec, Dictionary-based Approaches, Computational Stylometry
1. Introduction
Racism is an important issue which is not easily defined,
as racist ideas can be expressed in a variety of ways. Fur-
thermore, there is no clear definition of what exactly con-
stitutes a racist utterance; what is racist to one person is
highly likely to not be considered racist universally. Addi-
tionally, although there exist mechanisms for reporting acts
of racism, victims often neglect to do so as they feel that
reporting the situation will not solve anything, according
to the Belgian Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities
(CNTR).1 The scope of this issue, however, is currently un-
known. Hence, the goal of our system is two-fold: it can be
used to shed light on how many racist remarks are not being
reported online, and furthermore, the automated detection
of racism could provide interesting insights in the linguistic
mechanisms used in racist discourse.
In this study, we try to automatically detect racist language
in Dutch social media comments, using a dictionary-based
approach. We retrieved and annotated comments from two
public social media sites which were likely to attract racist
reactions according to the CNTR. We use a Support Vector
Machine to automatically classify comments, using hand-
crafted dictionaries, which were later expanded using auto-
mated techniques, as features.
We first discuss previous research on our subject and
methodology, and discuss the problem of defining racist
language (section 2). Next, we describe our data (section
3). Finally, after discussing the experimental setup (section
4), we present our results (section 5).
2. Related Research
The classification of racist insults presents us with the prob-
lem of giving an adequate definition of racism. More so
1http://www.diversiteit.be
than in other domains, judging whether an utterance is an
act of racism is highly personal and does not easily fit a
simple definition. The Belgian anti-racist law forbids dis-
crimination, violence and crime based on physical qualities
(like skin color), nationality or ethnicity, but does not men-
tion textual insults based on these qualities.2 Hence, this
definition is not adequate for our purposes, since it does
not include the racist utterances one would find on social
media; few utterances that people might perceive as racist
are actually punishable by law, as only utterances which
explicitly encourage the use of violence are illegal. For
this reason, we use a common sense definition of racist lan-
guage, including all negative utterances, negative general-
izations and insults concerning ethnicity, nationality, reli-
gion and culture. In this, we follow Orru` (2015), Bonilla-
Silva (2002) and Razavi et al. (2010), who show that racism
is no longer strictly limited to physical or ethnic qualities,
but can also include social and cultural aspects.
Additionally, several authors report linguistic markers of
racist discourse; Van Dijk (2002) reports that the num-
ber of available topics is greatly restricted when talking
about foreigners. Orru` (2015), who performed a qualita-
tive study of posts from Italian social media sites, shows
that these chosen topics are typically related to migra-
tion, crime and economy. Furthermore, the use of stereo-
types and prejudiced statements (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005;
Quasthoff, 1989), as well as a heightened occurrence of
truth claims (Greevy and Smeaton, 2004b; Greevy and
Smeaton, 2004a), are reported as typical characteristics of
racist discourse . Finally, racist utterances are said to con-
tain specific words and phrases, i.e. n-grams, significantly
more often than neutral texts, like “our own kind” and
2http://www.diversiteit.be/
de-antiracismewet-van-30-juli-1981
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“white civilization” (Greevy and Smeaton, 2004b; Greevy
and Smeaton, 2004a).
Stylistically, racist discourse is characterized by a higher
rate of certain word classes, like imperatives and adjectives
and a higher noun-adjective ratio (Orru`, 2015; Greevy and
Smeaton, 2004b; Greevy and Smeaton, 2004a). Greevy and
Smeaton also report a more frequent use of modals and
adverbs, which they link to the higher frequency of truth
claims in racist utterances (2004b; 2004a). In several stud-
ies, pronoun use is reported as an important feature in the
detection of racist language. While Orru` (2015) reports a
high frequency of (especially first person plural) pronouns
in racist data, Van Dijk (2002) reports a more general find-
ing: the importance of us and them constructions in racist
discourse. He explains that they involve a ‘semantic move
with a positive part about Us and a negative part about
Them’ (Van Dijk, 2002, p.150). Using such constructions,
one linguistically emphasizes - either deliberately or sub-
consciously - a divide between groups of people. A strict
interpretation implies that even positive utterances about
‘them’ can be perceived as racist, as they can also imply
a divide between us and them. In this sense, Van Dijk’s
definition of racism is subtler, but also broader, than the
definition used in our own research: we only count nega-
tive utterances and generalizations about groups of people
as racist.
Our dictionary-based approach is inspired by methods
used in previous research, like LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count) (Pennebaker et al., 2001). LIWC is
a dictionary-based computational tool that counts word
frequencies for both grammatical categories (e.g. pro-
nouns) and content-related categories (e.g. negative emo-
tion words). As LIWC uses counts per category instead of
individual words’ frequencies, it allows for broader gener-
alizations on functionally or semantically related words.
The construction of dictionary categories related to racist
discourse (cf. section 4.1) is largely based on linguistic
properties of racist language reported in earlier work (see
above). Additionally, the categories were adjusted to fit
the corpus used in the research, which differs from corpora
used in other studies. As our corpus is retrieved from so-
cial media sites with an anti-Islamic orientation, we added
categories to reflect anti-religious sentiment. The relevant
features in this study therefore differ from those reported in
other studies, as different words are used to insult different
groups of people (Greevy and Smeaton, 2004a).
Finally, some other successful quantitative approaches to
racism detection that have been used in earlier studies are a
bag of words (BoW) approach as well as the analysis of
part-of-speech (PoS) tags (Greevy and Smeaton, 2004b;
Greevy and Smeaton, 2004a). We leave the addition of
these features to future work.
3. Datasets and Annotations
In this section, we describe our data collection, our annota-
tion guidelines (3.1) and the results of our annotations (3.2
and 3.3).
For our current research we collected a corpus of social
media comments, consisting of comments retrieved from
Facebook sites which were likely to attract racist reactions
in their comments. We specifically targeted two sites: the
site of a prominent Belgian anti-Islamic organization, and
the site of a Belgian right-wing organization. In both cases
the Facebook sites were officially condoned by the orga-
nizations, and in the first case served as a communication
platform to organize political gatherings. While both sites,
the former more than the latter, explicitly profess to be non-
racist, the comments they attracted were still highly critical
of foreigners and, predictably, Muslims. This is also the
reason we mined comments from these sites, and not the
posts themselves. While the narrow focus of the sites in-
troduces bias into our data, as the opinions of the people
visiting these sites will not reflect the opinions of the gen-
eral population, they do contain a good proportion of racist
to non-racist data.
3.1 Annotation Style
We annotated the retrieved comments with three different
labels: ‘racist’, ‘non-racist’ and ‘invalid’.
The ‘racist’ label describes comments that contain negative
utterances or insults about someone’s ethnicity, nationality,
religion or culture. This definition also includes utterances
which equate, for example, an ethnic group to an extremist
group, as well as extreme generalizations. The following
examples are comments that were classified as racist:
1. Het zijn precies de vreemden die de haat of het racisme
opwekken bij de autochtonen.
It is the foreigners that elicit hate and racism from na-
tives.
2. Kan je niets aan doen dat je behoort tot het ras dat
nog minder verstand en gevoelens heeft in uw herse-
nen dan het stinkend gat van een VARKEN ! :-p
You cannot help the fact that you belong to the race
that has less intellect and sense in their brains than
the smelly behind of a PIG! :-P
3. Wil weer eens lukken dat wij met het vuilste krapuul
zitten, ik verschiet er zelfs niet van!
Once again we have to put up with the filthiest scum,
it doesn’t even surprise me anymore!
The label ‘invalid’ was used for comments that were written
in languages other than Dutch, or that did not contain any
textual information, i.e. comments that solely consist of
pictures or links. Before classification, we excluded these
from both our training and test set.
The final label, ‘non-racist’, was the default label. If a com-
ment was valid, but could not be considered racist accord-
ing to our definition, this was the label we used.
3.2 Training Data
To collect the training data, we used Pattern3 (De Smedt
and Daelemans, 2012) to scrape the 100 most recent posts
from both sites, and then extracted all comments which re-
acted to these comments. This resulted in 5759 extracted
comments: 4880 from the first site and 879 from the sec-
ond site. The second site attracted a lot less comments on
each post, possibly because the site posted more frequently.
3http://www.clips.uantwerpen.be/pattern
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# Train Comments # Test Comments
Non-racist 4500 443
Racist 924 164
Invalid 335 9
Table 1: Gold standard corpus sizes.
In addition to this, the organization behind the first site had
been figuring prominently in the news at the time of extrac-
tion, which might explain the divide in frequency of com-
ments between the two sites. The corpus was annotated by
two annotators, who were both students of comparable age
and background. When A and B did not agree on a label, a
third annotator, C, was used as a tiebreaker in order to ob-
tain gold-standard labels. Table 1 shows the gold standard
for the training set.
We calculated inter-annotator agreement using the Kappa
score (κ) (Cohen, 1968). On the training corpus, the agree-
ment score was κ = 0.60. Annotator A used the racist tag
much less often than annotator B. Interestingly, the agree-
ment remains relatively high; 79% of the comments that A
annotated as racist were also annotated as racist by B. Even
though B was much more inclined to call utterances racist,
A and B still shared a common ground regarding their def-
inition of racism. Examining the comments in detail, we
found that the difference can largely be explained by sensi-
tivity to insults and generalizations, as example 4 shows.
4. Oprotten die luizegaards [sic] !!!
Throw those lice carriers out!
While annotator B considers this utterance to be racist, an-
notator A does not, as it does not contain a specific refer-
ence to an ethnicity, nationality or religion. That is, when
not seen in the context of this specific annotation task this
sentence would not necessarily be called racist, just insult-
ing.
3.3 Test data
The test corpus was mined in the same way as the training
set, at a different point in time. We mined the first 500 and
first 116 comments from the first and second site, respec-
tively, which makes the proportion between sites more or
less identical to the the proportions in the train corpus. The
annotation scheme was identical to the one for the train set,
with the difference that C, who previously performed the
tiebreak, now became a regular annotator. The first 25%
of each batch of comments, i.e. 125 comments for the first
site and 30 comments for the second site, were annotated by
all three annotators to compute inter-annotator agreement.
The remaining comments were equally divided among an-
notators. The annotator agreement was κ = 0.54 (pairwise
average), which is lower than the agreement on the training
data. The reason for the lower agreement was that annota-
tor C often did not agree with A and B. Because the pattern
of mismatches between the annotators is quite regular, we
will now discuss some of the annotations in detail:
5. we kunnen niet iedereen hier binnen laten want dat
betekend [sic] het einde van de europese beschaving
We cannot let everyone in because that will mean the
end of European civilization
6. Eigen volk gaat voor, want die vuile manieren van de
EU moeten wij vanaf. Geen EU en geen VN. Waarde-
loos en tegen onze mensen. (eigen volk.)
Put our own people first, because we need to get rid of
the foul manners of the EU. No EU nor UN. Useless
and against our people. (own folk.)
7. Burgemeester Termont is voor de zwartzakken die
kiezen voor hem
Mayor Termont supports the black sacks, as they vote
for him
Annotator C used the ‘racist’ tag more often, which is prob-
ably due to the fact that he consistently annotated overt ide-
ological statements related to immigration as ‘racist’, while
the other annotators did not. The three examples mentioned
above are utterances that C classified as ‘racist’, but A and
B classified as ‘not racist’.
The cause of these consistent differences in annotations
might be cultural, as C is from the southern part of the
Netherlands, whereas A and B are native to the northern
part of Belgium. Some terms are simply misannotated by
C because they are Flemish vernacular expressions. For ex-
ample, zwartzak [black sack], from sentence 7, superfi-
cially looks like a derogatory term for a person of color, but
actually does not carry this meaning, as it is a slang word
for someone who collaborated with the German occupying
forces in the Second World War. While this could still be
classified as being racist, the point is that C only registered
this as a slang word based on skin color, and not a cultural
or political term. Finally, it is improbable that the cause
of these mismatches is annotator training, as A and B did
not discuss their annotations during the task. In addition to
this, C functioned as a tiebreaker in the first dataset, and
thus already had experience with the nature of the training
material.
4. Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe our experimental setup. We will
first discuss our dictionary-based approach, describing both
the LIWC dictionary we used as well as the construction of
dictionaries related to racist discourse (section 4.1). Next,
we will describe the preprocessing of the data (section 4.2).
4.1 Dictionaries
4.1.1 LIWC
In our classification task, we will use the LIWC dictionar-
ies for Dutch4 (Zijlstra et al., 2004). We hypothesize that
some of LIWC’s word categories can be useful in detecting
(implicit) racist discourse, as some of these categories are
associated with markers of racist discourse reported in pre-
vious research (cf. section 2), including pronouns, negative
emotion words, references to others, certainty, religion and
curse words.
4An exhaustive overview of all categories in the Dutch version
of LIWC can be found in Zijlstra et al. (2004, p. 277-278).
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Negative Neutral
Skin color
Nationality
Religion
Migration
Country
Stereotypes
Culture
Crime
Race
Disease
Table 2: Overview of the categories in the discourse dictio-
nary
4.1.2 Discourse Dictionaries
In addition to the Dutch LIWC data, we created a dictio-
nary containing words that specifically relate to racist dis-
course. We expect a dictionary-based approach in which
words are grouped into categories to work well in this case
because many of the racist terms used in our corpus were
neologisms and hapaxes, like halalhoer (halal prosti-
tute). Alternatively, existing terms are often reused in a
ridiculing fashion, e.g. using the word mossel (mussel)
to refer to Muslims. The dictionary was created as follows:
after annotation, terms pertaining to racist discourse were
manually extracted from the training data. These were then
grouped into different categories, where most categories
have both a neutral and a negative subcategory. The neg-
ative subcategory contains explicit insults, while the neu-
tral subcategory contains words that are normally used in a
neutral fashion, e.g. zwart (black), Marokkaan (Moroc-
can), but which might also be used in a more implicit racist
discourse; e.g. people that often talk about nationalities or
skin color might be participating in a racist us and them
discourse. An overview of the categories can be found in
Table 2.
After creating the dictionary, we expanded these word lists
both manually and automatically. First, we manually added
an extensive list of countries, nationalities and languages, to
remove some of the bias present in our training corpus. To
combat sparsity, and to catch productive compounds which
are likely to be used in a racist manner, we added wildcards
to the beginning or end of certain words. We used two dif-
ferent wildcards. * is an inclusive wildcard; it matches the
word with or without any affixes, e.g. moslim* matches
both moslim (Muslim) and moslims (Muslims). + is an
exclusive wildcard; it only matches words when an affix is
attached, e.g. +moslim will match rotmoslim (Rotten
Muslim) but not moslim by itself. In our corpus (which is
skewed towards racism), the + will almost always represent
a derogatory prefix, which is why it figures more promi-
nently in the negative part of our dictionary.
A downside of using dictionaries for the detection of
racism, is that they do not include a measure of context.
Therefore, a sentence such as “My brother hated the North
African brown rice and lentils we made for dinner”5 will
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the sen-
tence.
#Words
Original 1055
Expanded 3845
Cleaned 3532
Table 3: Dictionary word frequencies.
be classified as racist, regardless of the fact that the words
above do not occur in a racist context. Approaches based
on word unigrams or bigrams face similar problems. This
problem is currently partially absolved by the fact that we
are working with a corpus skewed towards racism: words
like ‘brown’ and ‘African’ are more likely to be racist words
in our corpus than in general text.
4.1.3 Automated Dictionary Expansion
To broaden the coverage of the categories in our dictionary,
we performed dictionary expansion on both the neutral and
the negative categories using word2vec (Mikolov et al.,
2013). word2vec is a collection of models capable of
capturing semantic similarity between words based on the
sentential contexts in which these words occur. It does so
by projecting words into an n-dimensional space, and giv-
ing words with similar contexts similar places in this space.
Hence, words which are closer to each other as measured
by cosine distance, are more similar. Because we observed
considerable semantic variation in the insults in our corpus,
we expect that dictionary expansion using word2vec will
lead to the extraction of previously unknown insults, as we
assume that similar insults are used in similar contexts. In
parallel, we know that a lot of words belonging to certain
semantic categories, such as diseases and animals, can al-
most invariably be used as insults.
The expansion proceeded as follows: for each word in the
dictionary, we retrieved the five closest words, i.e. the five
most similar words, in the n-dimensional space, and added
these to the dictionary. Wildcards were not taken into ac-
count for this task, e.g. *jood was replaced by jood for
the purposes of expansion. As such, the expanded words do
not have any wildcards attached to them. For expansion we
used the best-performing model from Tulkens et al. (2016),
which is based on a corpus of 3.9 billion words of general
Dutch text. Because this word2vec model was trained
on general text, the semantic relations contained therein are
not based on racist or insulting text, which will improve the
coverage of our expanded categories.
After expansion, we manually searched the expanded dic-
tionaries and removed obviously incorrect items. Because
the word2vec model also includes some non-Dutch text,
e.g. Spanish, some categories were expanded incorrectly.
As a result, we have 3 different dictionaries with which we
perform our experiments: the original dictionary which was
based on the training data, a version which was expanded
using word2vec, and a cleaned version of this expanded
version. The word frequencies of the dictionaries are given
in Table 3. An example of expansion is given in Table 4.
4.2 Preprocessing and Featurization
For preprocessing, the text was first tokenized using the
Dutch tokenizer from Pattern (De Smedt and Daele-
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Dictionary Example
Original: mohammed*
Expanded: mohammed*, mohamed, mohammad,
muhammed, vzmh, hassan
Cleaned: mohammed*, mohamed, mohammad,
muhammed, vzmh, hassan
Table 4: An example of expansion. The original dictionary
only contains a single word. In the expanded version, the
bold words have been added. In the third version the words
that were struck through have been removed.
mans, 2012), and then lowercased and split on whitespace,
which resulted in lists of words which are appropriate for
lexical processing.
Our dictionary-based approach, like LIWC, creates an n-
dimensional vector of normalized and scaled numbers,
where n is the number of dictionary categories. These num-
bers are obtained by dividing the frequency of words in ev-
ery specific category by the total number of words in the
comment. Because all features are already normalized and
scaled, there was no need for further scaling. Furthermore,
because the number of features is so small, we did not per-
form explicit feature selection.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1 Performance on the Training Set
We estimated the optimal values for the SVM parameters
by an exhaustive search through the parameter space, which
led to the selection of an RBF kernel with a C value of 1 and
a gamma of 0. For the SVM and other experiments, we used
the implementation from Scikit-Learn (Pedregosa et
al., 2011). Using cross-validation on the training data, all
dictionary-based approaches with lexical categories related
to racist discourse significantly outperformed models using
only LIWC’s general word categories. Since the current
research concerns the binary classification of racist utter-
ances, we only report scores for the positive class, i.e. the
racist class. When only LIWC-categories were used as fea-
tures, an F-score of 0.34 (std. dev. 0.07) was obtained for
the racist class. When using the original discourse dictio-
nary, we reached an F-score of 0.50 (std. dev. 0.05). Au-
tomatic expansion of the categories did not influence per-
formance either (F-score 0.50, std. dev. 0.05). Similar re-
sults (0.49 F-score, std. dev. 0.05) were obtained when the
expanded racism dictionaries were manually filtered. This
result is not surprising, as the original dictionaries were cre-
ated from the training data, and might form an exhaustive
catalog of racist terms in the original corpus.
Combining the features generated by LIWC with the spe-
cific dictionary-based features led to worse results com-
pared to the dictionary-based features by themselves (F-
score 0.40, std. dev. 0.07 for the best-performing model).
Finally, all models based on the dictionary features as well
as the combined model outperformed a unigram baseline
of 0.36, but the LIWC model did not. We also report
a weighted random baseline (WRB), which was outper-
formed by all models.
P R F
Original 0.42 0.61 0.50
Expanded 0.40 0.64 0.50
Cleaned 0.40 0.64 0.49
LIWC 0.27 0.47 0.34
Combined 0.36 0.44 0.40
Unigram 0.38 0.34 0.36
WRB 0.27 0.27 0.27
Table 5: Results on the train set. WRB is a weighted ran-
dom baseline.
5.2 Testing the Effect of Expansion
As seen above, the performance of the different models on
the train set was comparable, regardless of their expansion.
This is due to the creation procedure for the dictionary: be-
cause the words in the original dictionary were directly re-
trieved from the training data, the expanded and cleaned
versions might not be able to demonstrate their general-
ization performance, as most of the racist words from the
training data will be included in the original dictionaries as
well as the expanded dictionaries. This artifact might dis-
appear in the test set, which was retrieved from the same
two sites, but will most likely contain unseen words. These
unseen words will not be present in the original dictionary,
but could be present in the expanded version.
As Table 6 shows, the models obtain largely comparable
performance on the test set, and outperform the unigram
baseline by a wide margin. In comparison to previous re-
search, our approach leads to worse results than those of
Greevy and Smeaton (2004a), who report a precision score
of 0.93 and a recall score of 0.87, using an SVM with BOW
features together with frequency-based term weights. It is,
however, difficult to compare these scores to our perfor-
mance, given that the data, method, and language differ.
Our best-performing model was based on the expanded
and cleaned version of the dictionary, but this model only
slightly outperformed the other models. Additionally, we
also computed Area Under the Receiving Operator Char-
acteristic Curve (ROC-AUC) scores for all models, also
shown in Table 6. ROC-AUC shows the probability of rank-
ing a randomly chosen positive instance above a randomly
chosen negative instance, thereby giving an indication of
the overall performance of the models. This shows that all
dictionaries have comparable AUC scores, and that each
dictionary outperforms the unigram baseline. To obtain ad-
ditional evidence, we computed the statistical significance
of performance differences between the models based on
the dictionaries and unigram baseline model using approx-
imate randomization testing (ART) (Noreen, 1989).6 An
ART test between dictionary models reveals that none of
the models had performance differences that were statisti-
cally significant. Similarly, all dictionary models outper-
formed the unigram baseline with statistical significance,
with p < 0.01 for the models based on the cleaned and ex-
panded dictionaries, and p < 0.05 for the models based on
6We used the implementation by Vincent Van Asch, which
is available from the CLiPS website http://www.clips.
uantwerpen.be/scripts/art
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P R F AUC
Original 0.51 0.39 0.44 0.63
Expanded 0.48 0.43 0.45 0.63
Cleaned 0.49 0.43 0.46 0.63
Unigram 0.46 0.20 0.28 0.56
Table 6: P, R, F and ROC-AUC scores on the test set.
% Coverage # comments # racist
Original 0.014 98 43
Expanded 0.035 212 82
Cleaned 0.034 206 81
Table 7: Coverage of the various dictionaries in vocabu-
lary percentage, number of comments, and number of racist
comments.
the original dictionary.
To get more insight into why the expanded models were not
more successful, we calculated dictionary coverage for ev-
ery dictionary separately on the test set. If the expanded
dictionaries do not have increased coverage, the reason
for their similar performance is clear: not enough words
have been added to affect the performance in any reason-
able way. As Table 7 indicates, the coverage of the ex-
panded dictionaries did increase, which indicates that the
automated expansion, or manual deletion for that matter,
contrary to expectations, did not add words that were use-
ful for the classification of racist content. To obtain addi-
tional evidence for this claim, we looked at the number of
comments that contained words from the original, cleaned
and expanded dictionaries. The coverage in terms of total
comments also increased, as well as the absolute number of
racist comments that contained the added terms. Because
the coverage in number of comments did not increase the
performance of the dictionaries, we hypothesize that the
terms that were included in the expanded dictionaries were
not distributed clearly enough (over racist and neutral texts)
to make a difference in the performance on the classifica-
tion task.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a dictionary-based computational tool for au-
tomatic racism detection in Dutch social media comments.
These comments were retrieved from public social me-
dia sites with an anti-Islamic orientation. The definition
of racism we used to annotate the comments therefore in-
cludes religious and cultural racism as well, a phenomenon
reported on in different studies (Orru`, 2015; Bonilla-Silva,
2002; Razavi et al., 2010).
We use a Support Vector Machine to classify comments as
racist or not based on the distribution of the comments’
words over different word categories related to racist dis-
course. To evaluate the performance, we used our own
annotations as gold standard. The best-performing model
obtained an F-score of 0.46 for the racist class on the test
set, which is an acceptable decrease in performance com-
pared to cross-validation experiments on the training data
(F-score 0.49, std. dev. 0.05). The dictionary used by the
model was manually created by retrieving possibly racist
and more neutral terms from the training data during anno-
tation. The dictionary was then manually expanded, auto-
matically expanded with a word2vec model and finally
manually cleaned, i.e. irrelevant terms that were added
automatically were removed. It did not prove useful to
use general stylistic or content-based word categories along
with the word lists specifically related to racist discourse.
Surprisingly, the expansion of the manually crafted dictio-
nary did not boost the model’s performance significantly.
In (cross-validated) experiments on the training data, this
makes sense, as the words in the different categories are re-
trieved from the training data itself, artificially making the
dictionary very appropriate for the task. In the test runs,
however, a better result could be expected from the gen-
eralized word lists. The expanded versions of the dictio-
nary had higher overall coverage for the words in the cor-
pus, as well as higher coverage in number of comments and
in number of racist comments. This shows that the words
that were automatically added, did indeed occur in our cor-
pus. As the model’s performance more or less stagnated
when using the expanded categories compared to the origi-
nal ones, we hypothesize that the terms that were automati-
cally added by the word2vec model were irrelevant to the
task of discriminating between racist and neutral texts.
In terms of future work, we will expand our research ef-
forts to include more general social media text. Because
we currently only use material which was gathered from
sites skewed towards racism, the performance of our dictio-
nary might have been artificially heightened, as the words
in the dictionary only occur in racist contexts in our cor-
pus. Therefore, including more general social media texts
will serve as a good test of the generality of our dictionaries
with regards to detecting insulting material.
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Abstract 
Electronic handling of information is one of the defining technologies of the digital age. These same technologies have been exploited 
by unethical hands in what is now known as cybercrime. Cybercrime is of different types but of importance to the present study is the 
419 Scam because it is generally (yet controversially) linked with a particular country - Nigeria. Previous research that attempted to 
unravel the controversy applied the Internet Protocol address tracing technique. The present study applied the statistical language 
modelling technique to investigate the propensity of Nigeria's involvement in authoring these fraudulent mails. Using a hierarchical 
modelling approach proposed in the study, 28.85% of anonymous electronic scam mails were classified as being from Nigeria among 
four other countries. The study concluded that linguistic cues have potentials of being used for investigating transnational digital breaches 
and that electronic scam mail problem cannot be pinned down to Nigeria as believed generally, though Nigeria could be one of the 
countries that are prominent in authoring such mails.  
 
Keywords: digital forensics, 419 scam, statistical language modelling 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Electronic handling of information is one of the defining 
technologies of the digital age.  The age is characterized by 
the application of computer technology as a transformative 
tool to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in personal, 
commercial, educational, governmental, and other facets of 
modern life (Reith, Carr, and Gunsch, 2002). However, 
alongside the benefits derivable from the ability to 
automatically manage so much information are threats to 
communications and transactions conducted electronically. 
Just as ICT provides new opportunities to operate and 
expand one’s presence and reach, it also presents 
opportunities for those with criminal intentions, leaving its 
numerous users highly exposed to the threat of cyber attack 
and cybercrime (Choo, 2011). 
The term cybercrime encompasses traditional crimes such 
as fraud, scam, theft, forgery, harassment, blackmail, 
embezzlement, in as much as the computer or its network 
is employed for perpetration; it also involves a host of new 
criminal activities which cannot be perpetrated but with 
computer or its network, such as spam, denial of service 
attacks and distribution of viruses (Torosyan, 2003; 
Alshalan, 2006).  
The advance fee fraud (also known as Internet Scam, 
Nigerian 419 Scam or Yahoo-Yahoo) is a type of internet 
fraud that is generally believed to have originated from 
Nigeria and perpetrated mostly by Nigerians. This stance 
has however, been faced with much controversy. 
Perceptions on the extent of Nigeria’s involvement in the 
current status of advance fee fraud can be categorised into 
three; while the first two views are distinctly opposite, the 
third stands somewhere in between them. Holding the first 
view are sources that believe that Nigeria is the main, if not 
the sole source, of this fraud (State Department Publication, 
1997). Holding the second view are sources that refute the 
fact that Nigeria is as prominent in cybercrime as portrayed 
by those other reports. They argued that the increased 
consciousness about crime and the 419 scams in particular 
is only a motive to criminalize the Nigerian state (Bayart, 
Ellis and Hibou, 1999). Holding the third view are those of 
the opinion that the term "Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud" is 
only partially accurate and the problem is truly one of 
international dimension with victims and offenders being 
located across the globe (Smith, Holmes and Kaufmann, 
2001).  
Previous studies that focused on unravelling the 
controversy used e-mail header (Edelson, 2003) and 
Internet Protocol (IP) address tracing technique (Longe and 
Osofisan, 2011). Effective as their methods are however, 
they are constrained by geographical boundaries and 
cannot detect the nationality of a scammer who sends an 
electronic scam mail from outside the shores of his own 
country. The methods are also not effective against some 
computer security frauds such as phishing, spoofing and 
masquerading. There is therefore, a need for new 
methodologies for investigating sources of such fraudulent 
e-mail. 
Dyrud (2005) analysed ninety-three (93) electronic scam 
letters (which he called Nigerian scam letters) which he 
received over a period of 10 months. While analysing one 
of the letters he commented: 
 
Some are ludicrously transparent, such as John 
Kredoski’s November, November 13, 2004 e-
mail. He lives in Reno, has suffered a heart 
attack, and has chosen to write to me because I 
am “a fellow American.” “Do not,” he 
cautions, “associates this letter as numerous 
letters we receive from Africa. If you need my 
passport to prove my identity, I will send it to 
you.” For a native-born American, his syntax 
and vocabulary are curiously similar to his 
Nigerian counterparts. (Dyrud, 2005: p. 7). 
 
Although Dyrud (2005) did not present any objective 
means of deducing that the received mails were Nigerian, 
he was able to differentiate the language usage of the writer 
from his own American style, despite the writer’s claim of 
being an American. Exploitation of linguistic cues can 
therefore, aid in further detection of sources of anonymous 
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electronic mails; this is because a writer’s natural language 
is less susceptible to deception.  
Language is an intricate system of structural components 
for encoding and decoding information (Cruz-Ferreira and 
Abraham, 2006).  All human languages exhibit a great deal 
of internal variations in terms of a specific set of linguistic 
items or human speech patterns such as words, 
idiosyncratic, structural or grammatical features which can 
uniquely associate with some external factors such as 
geographical area or social group, time, situation, genre, 
subject, author amongst others (Adetugbo, 1979; Banjo, 
1979; Wardhaugh, 1994). The phenomenon of Standard 
Nigerian Spoken English was proposed by Banjo in 1971 
(Jowiit, 1991). According to Adetugbo (1979) the fact that 
English language in Nigeria is regarded as a dialect of 
English means that it preserves the same common core 
items of vocabulary and structure found in other varieties 
of English everywhere else, however,  the implications of 
spatial dialect differentiation, the mode of acquisition of the 
English language in Nigeria, interference of native 
languages on English in its second language situation in 
Nigeria and the non-equivalence of the social and cultural 
environment in Nigeria with that of any other English 
language speaking community, demanded that 
communicative competence in English in Nigeria cannot 
be the same as for any other variety of English. 
The features of the Nigerian variant of the language have 
been well researched in the humanities, for example, on the 
level of morphology, due to the influence of the dominant 
local language or mother tongue the spoken English shows 
variations in accent. On the lexical level, the problem with 
the use of the article (definite and indefinite) is endemic 
(Egbe, 1979). Kujore (1985) and Jowiit (1991) composed 
specific variations alongside the standard British English in 
order to show the growing divergence between the 
Nigerian usage and British usage of the language. Opesade, 
Adegbola and Tiamiyu (2013) validated quantitatively the 
presence of English language variants of five African 
countries, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra-
Leone. If Nigerian and other countries' variants of the 
English language exist, then this could be a means of 
identifying Nigerian texts written in the English language 
from non-Nigerian text written in the other variants of same 
language.  
1.2 Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study was to establish and apply 
statistical language models for the detection of electronic 
scam mail likely to be of Nigerian origin, based on 
linguistic cues. To achieve the objective of the study, the 
following sub-objectives were pursued: 
1. To determine a precise model for separating 
electronic texts of Nigerian linguistic origin from 
those of other countries (Cameroon, Ghana, 
Liberia, Sierra-Leone). 
2. 2. To apply the model to classify electronic scam 
mail into countries of origin based on linguistic 
cues. 
1.3 Research Questions 
1. What is the performance of the (NigGh_Other) model 
that classifies Nigerian and Ghanaian texts from those from 
the other three countries (Liberia, Cameroon and Sierra 
Leone)? 
2. What is the performance of the (Nig_Gh) model that 
classifies Nigerian and Ghanaian texts only?  
3. What percentage of electronic scam mail are classified 
to be Nigerian based on linguistic cues. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
The research was carried out using modelling and 
simulation methodologies. In this study, online English 
texts of five African countries were modelled statistically. 
Out of a population of all English speaking countries in 
West Africa including Cameroon, the domains of 
estimation selected for this study were Nigeria, Ghana, 
Liberia, Cameroon and Sierra-Leone.  Nigeria is the 
country of focus in this investigation, while Ghana, Liberia, 
Cameroon and Sierra-Leone are selected for the purpose of 
comparing their English language usages to that of Nigeria 
as a means of providing alternative candidate countries in 
the attribution of the electronic scam mails.  
3.2 Target Populations 
To achieve the objective of this study, two populations 
were examined. They were: 
i. All readers’ comments posted on the fifty–two (52) 
pages contained (as of November 2011) in 
www.topix.com websites of the five countries 
selected for the study and the additional four pages 
posted (as of February 2012) in the same websites.  
ii. All eight hundred and seventy-three (873) electronic 
scam mails available in scam archives such as scam 
bating sites as of 14th March 2011. Scam baiting, 
also known as counter scamming, is the practice of 
feigning interest in a fraudulent scheme in order to 
manipulate a scammer.  
3.3 Sampling Techniques for Composition of 
Study Corpora 
A multistage sampling technique was employed for textual 
data collection. The sampling procedure for each of the two 
populations is as presented below: 
3.3.1 Sampling Technique for the www.topix.com Texts  
A multistage sampling technique was used to select a 
representative sample of electronic texts from the 
population of texts contained in the relevant country pages 
of the website www.topix.com.  To get the texts that 
could be useful for a supervised learning approach of the 
study, each text was opened, read and assessed based on 
the number of words contained and a sense of affiliation to 
the respective country as depicted in the content. A 
comment was considered to be affiliated to (and labelled to 
be from) a particular country if it was found in that 
country's forum and if it contained such phrases as 'our 
country', 'our beloved country' and other related ones in its 
discourse. Initially the researchers targeted selecting texts 
with a hundred or more words; however, this was reduced 
to texts with twenty (20) or more words because of the 
scarcity of large texts on the discussion forums. The 
numbers of texts selected for the study in November 2011 
and based on the assessment criteria are as shown in Table 
1. 
Another set of one hundred and fifteen (115) texts were 
collected from the country forums of www.topix.com in 
February 2012. A complete enumeration of all texts on the 
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first page of each country's website was carried out; all 
texts which met the conditions of at least twenty words with 
evidence of affiliation to the relevant country, but which 
had not been selected previously were selected. The one 
hundred and fifteen texts selected (as the validation set) are 
as shown in Table 2. 
3.3.2 Sampling Technique for the Electronic Scam 
Data 
A multistage sampling technique was also used for this 
population. The scam baiting sites selected for the study, 
the total number of electronic scam mails baited in each and 
the sample size are shown in Table 3.  
 
Scam Baiter’s website No. of 
scam 
mails 
No. 
selected 
www.419eater.com 133 53 
www.419hell.com 30 12 
www.419baiter.com 19 8 
www.scamorama.com 598 239 
www.ebolamonkeyman.com 24 10 
www.monkeyspit.net/inbox/ 7 3 
www.sweetchillisauce.com/
nigeria.html 
41 16 
www.whatsthebloodypoint. 
com 
11 4 
http://419.bittenus.com 10 4 
Total  873 349 
Table 3: Scam Baiters’ Websites and Sample Sizes 
(Date: 14/3/2011) 
3.4 Text Pre-processing and Processing 
The corpora were subjected to pre-processing in order to 
put them in the format expected by the relevant software 
for text processing. The pre-processing tasks included 
deletion of e-mail headers, removal of control codes, text 
aggregation, and removal of non-ASCII characters. 
Text processing was achieved by extracting predetermined 
linguistic features from the sampled texts using computer 
codes written by the researchers in the Python2 
programming language, based on the natural language 
toolkit (NLTK) version 2.0. Some of the specific issues 
handled in the course of text processing were tokenization, 
part of speech tagging and linguistic feature extraction.  
Extracted features were syntactic features comprising the 
twenty (20) most frequent function words in the topix.com 
corpus, twenty (20) most frequent function words in the 
scam mail corpus (out of which seventeen most frequent 
function words that are common to topix.com corpus and 
scam mail corpus were used for analysis).  Idiosyncratic 
features comprising adverb-verb part of speech (POS) 
bigram distribution and article omission/inclusion 
distribution. Structural features comprising lexical 
diversity; and content specific features twenty (20) most 
frequent noun, adjective, verb and adverb unigrams in the 
topix.com corpus, twenty (20) most frequent noun, 
adjective, verb and adverb unigrams in the scam mail 
corpus (out of which thirteen most frequent content words 
that are common to topix.com corpus and scam mail corpus 
were used for analysis).  
The decision to extract twenty most frequent features 
(function word, noun, adjective, verb and adverb unigrams) 
was a result of a prior experiment by the researchers which 
showed that the summation of the frequencies of 
occurrence of the twenty most frequent features accounted 
for at least 60% of the cumulative frequency of all features 
extracted in each case. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Although academic researchers have tended to favour the 
use of Support Vector Machines (SVMs), there is still a 
division on the choice of the best machine learning method, 
particularly in the anti-spam community (Sculley and 
Wachman, 2007). Also in the words of Witten and Frank 
(2005): 
 
Experience shows that no single machine 
learning scheme is appropriate to all machine 
learning problems. The universal learner is an 
idealistic fantasy. Real datasets vary and to 
obtain accurate models, the bias of the learning 
algorithm must match the structure of the 
Country's forum website No. of pages Pages selected No. of selected texts 
www.topix.com/forum/world/nigeria 35 1 30 
www.topix.com/forum/world/ghana 10 1 45 
www.topix.com/forum/world/liberia 4 1 10 
www.topix.com/forum/world/cameroon 4 1 15 
www.topix.com/forum/world/sierra-leone 4 1 15 
Total no. of Texts 115 
Table 2: Validation Data Set 
	
Country's forum website No. of pages Pages selected No. of selected texts 
www.topix.com/forum/world/nigeria 31 2,8,13,25 425 
www.topix.com/forum/world/ghana 9 2,3,6.9 317 
www.topix.com/forum/world/liberia 4 1-4 130 
www.topix.com/forum/world/cameroon 4 1-4 241 
www.topix.com/forum/world/sierra-leone 4 1-4 357 
Total no. of Texts 1,470 
Table 1: Training Data Set 
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domain; machine learning like data mining is an 
experimental science. (Witten and Frank: p. 
365). 
 
Thus, an experiment was carried out to determine the most 
precise machine learning algorithm for the study data set 
using the experimenter view of the open source Waikato 
Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) data 
mining software. Based on the result of the experiment, the 
Instance Based K-nearest (IBK) Neighbour algorithm was 
found to be the most precise in terms of accuracy and kappa 
statistic. Hence, the Instance Based K-nearest (IBK) 
Neighbour algorithm was used for the classification of the 
study's data sets based on a proposed hierarchical 
modelling approach. 
3.5 Proposed Hierarchical Modelling Approach 
This is a recursive approach proposed by the researchers 
based on the fact that human languages (and variants of a 
language) are not exclusively independent of one another 
(Bird, Klein and Loper, 2007), and on our understanding of 
the linguistic similarities among the English language 
variants of the five African countries in the study as 
revealed in Opesade, Adegbola and Tiamiyu (2013). 
Although each variant of the English language in the five 
countries differed from one another, there were still 
similarities among different pairs. For example, the 
Nigerian variant was found to be closest to the Ghanaian, 
followed be Sierra Leonean and Liberian and lastly 
Cameroonian.  
In the proposed approach, binary classification tasks were 
performed such that the Nigerian and Ghanaian sub-
corpora were first treated as one and separated from the 
other three, after which the two sub-corpora were classified 
into their respective country classes (Nigeria or Ghana). 
This was done because of the discovered similarity 
between the Nigerian and Ghanaian variants. 
4. Presentation of Results 
Research Question 1: What is the performance of the 
(NigGh_Others) model that classifies Nigerian and 
Ghanaian texts from those from the other three countries 
(Liberia, Cameroon and Sierra Leone)? 
Based on 10-fold cross validation repeated ten times, the 
model's accuracy and kappa statistic were 67.619% and 
0.3518 respectively.  The detailed performance of the 
Instance based (IBK) model that classified training data set 
of Nigerian and Ghanaian linguistic origin from those of 
the three other countries is as shown in Table 4.  
The precision values for the Nigeria/Ghana class (NGGH), 
others (NotNGGH) were 0.665 and 0.689 respectively, 
with a weighted average of 0.677. The model's recall values 
for the Nigeria/Ghana (NGGH), others (NotNGGH) were 
0.721 and 0.63 respectively and with a weighted average of 
0.676. The F-measures for the Nigeria/Ghana class 
(NGGH) and others (NotNGGH) were 0.692 and 0.659 
respectively.  The confusion matrix of the classification 
(Table 5) shows that four hundred and fifty-nine (459) out 
of seven hundred and twenty-eight (728) others 
(NotNGGH) texts were classified correctly, giving an 
accuracy value 63.0%. 
 
NotNGGH NGGH Classified 
as 
Accuracy 
(%) 
459 269 NotNGGH 63.0 
207 535 NGGH 72.1 
Table 5: Confusion Matrix of the NigGh_Others 
Model using Topix_training Set 
 
Five hundred and thirty-five (535) out of seven hundred 
and forty-two (742) Nigerian/Ghanaian (NGGH) texts 
were classified correctly, giving an accuracy value 72.1%.  
The NigGh_Others model was thereafter used to predict the 
sources of two hundred and fifty-three anonymous 
electronic scam mails as Nigerian/Ghanaian or other 
(Liberian, Cameroonian, Sierra-Leonean). The prediction 
is as shown in Table 6. 
 
Predicted Class Count Percentage 
classified (%) 
Nigerian/Ghana 119 47.04 
Others (Liberia, 
Cameroon, Sierra Leone) 
134 52.96 
Total 253 100 
Table 6: NigGh_Others model’s Prediction of 
Electronic Scam Mails Classes 
 
About forty-seven percent (47.04%), that is, one hundred 
and nineteen (119) of the scam mails were classified as 
being Nigeria/Ghana while the remaining 52.96% was 
classified as being Others (Liberia, Cameroon, Sierra 
Leone). 
Research Question 2: What is the performance of the 
model (Nig_Gh model) that classifies Nigerian and 
Ghanaian texts only?  
Texts from countries other than Nigeria and Ghana were 
removed from the training and Topix_test set, also scam 
mails classified as being from countries other than Nigeria 
and Ghana were excluded. The remaining texts were from 
two classes, that is, the Nigerian and Ghanaian class only. 
Accuracy and kappa statistic of the model were 67.66% and 
0.3359 respectively. The detailed performance of the 
Nig_Gh model based on 10-fold cross validation is as 
shown in Table 7.  
The precision values for the Ghanaian and Nigerian sub-
corpora were 0.626 and 0.712 respectively, with a weighted 
average precision of 0.675. The model's values of recall for 
the Ghanaian and Nigerian sub-corpora were 0.603 and 
0.732 respectively, with a weighted average recall of 0.677. 
 TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-score ROC Area 
NotNGGH 0.630 0.279 0.689 0.630 0.659 0.68 
NGGH 0.721 0.370 0.665 0.721 0.692 0.68 
Weighted Average 0.676 0.325 0.677 0.676 0.675 0.68 
Table 4: Detailed Performance of the NigGh_Others Model 
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The F-measures for the Ghanaian (GH) and Nigerian (NG) 
classes were 0.614 and 0.722 respectively.   Table 8 shows 
the confusion matrix of the classification (Nig_Gh) model. 
  
Nigeria Ghana Classified as Accuracy 
(%) 
311 114 Nigeria 73.2 
126 191 Ghana 60.3 
Table 8: Confusion Matrix of the Nig_Gh Model on 
Training Set 
 
The confusion matrix shows that three hundred and eleven 
(311) out of four hundred and twenty-five (425) Nigerian 
texts were classified correctly, giving an accuracy value of 
73.2% for the Nigerian sub-corpora; while one hundred and 
ninety-one (191) out of three hundred and seventeen (317) 
Ghanaian texts were classified correctly, giving 60.3% 
accuracy value. The Nig_Gh model was thereafter used to 
predict the sources of the one hundred and nineteen (119) 
anonymous electronic scam mails classified as 
Nigerian/Ghanaian in Table 5. The prediction is as shown 
in Table 9. 
 
Predicted Class Count Percentage (%) 
Nigerian 
 
73 61.3 
 Ghanaian 
 
46 38.7 
 Total 119 100 
Table 9: Nig_Gh model’s Prediction of Electronic 
Scam Mails Classes 
 
Out of the one hundred and nine (119) scam mails 
classified to be from a combination of Nigerian and 
Ghanaian texts in Table 5, the Nig_Gh model predicted 
seventy-three (73) to be from Nigeria and forty-six (46) to 
be from Ghana. 
 
Research Question 3: What percentage of electronic scam 
mail are classified to be Nigerian relative to the other four 
countries, based on linguistic cues? 
Table 10 shows the percentage of scam mail classified to 
be from Nigeria relative to the other four countries. 
Seventy-three (73) out of the 253 scam mail in the study 
were classified to be from Nigeria. This shows that about 
28.85% of the scam mails are classified to be from Nigeria 
based on linguistic cues. 
4.1 Model Validation 
The two-level model approach was validated on the one 
hundred and fifteen (115) topix validation data set. The 
accuracy and kappa statistic were 60.87% and 0.2153 
respectively for the NigGh_Others model and 70.67 % and 
0.3774 respectively for the Nig_Gh model. The weighted 
F-Measures were 0.618 and 0.716 for the NigGh_Others 
and Nig_Gh models respectively. 
 
 
Predicted Class Count Percentage 
(%) 
Nigerian 
 
73 28.85 
 
 
 
Ghanaian 
 
46 18.18 
 Others (Cameroon, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone) 
134 52.96 
Total 253 100 
Table 10: Nig_Gh Model’s Prediction of Electronic 
Scam Mails' Classes 
5. Discussion of Findings on the Research 
Questions 
Using the two-level modelling approach, 28.85% of 
anonymous electronic scam mails were classified as being 
from Nigeria. This showed that among five countries, about 
one-third of the two hundred and fifty-three electronic 
scam mail in the study were predicted to be from Nigeria. 
This result is mid-way between the findings of Longe and 
Osofisan (2011) whose analysis of electronic mails 
provided results that deviated from the generally held 
beliefs and cast some shadows on widely held opinions on 
the origins of 419 mails and that of  Edelson (2003) who 
reported that 67% of the scam e-mails were from Nigeria. 
The finding of this study therefore, supports the third view 
of the controversial views on the acclaimed source of 
electronic scam mail. This third view as submitted by 
Smith et al. (2001) is that the term "Nigerian Advance Fee 
Fraud" is only partially accurate and the problem is truly 
one of international dimension with victims and offenders 
being located across the globe. However, Nigeria may be 
one of the countries where scam mail authoring is 
prominent, as informed by a relatively high percentage 
accrued to the country among four other countries.  
The percentage of scam mail classified to be Nigerian was 
higher than average, although not as high as one would 
expect as it has been believed generally that Nigeria was 
responsible for the crime. The implication of this is that 
electronic scam mail problem cannot be pinned down to 
Nigeria. However, it is possible that Nigeria is one of the 
countries that are prominent in authoring such mails. The 
performance of our model despite the few words contained 
in the comments of the study corpora shows that the use of 
linguistic cues in authorship profiling of anonymous texts 
is promising. Finally, the improvement in model 
performance when the similarity between Nigerian and 
Ghanaian texts was put into consideration implies that 
linguistic similarities between variant of language in 
consideration should be resolved in order to improve 
classification model performance. 
 TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-score ROC Area 
NG 0.732 0.397 0.712 0.732 0.722 0.658 
GH 0.603 0.268 0.626 0.603 0.614 0.658 
Weighted Average 0.677 0.342 0.675 0.677 0.676 0.658 
Table 7: Detailed Prediction Performance of the Nig_Gh Model 
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5.1 Limitations of the Study 
The availability of a corpus of electronic scam mail with 
authenticated country sources could have been more 
appropriate for the study, in the absence of this, the 
available corpus of www.topix.com was used as a surrogate. 
Other limitations include the relatively low number of 
words in the comments of the training and validation 
dataset, natural language processing applications, 
especially for the purpose of authorship attribution perform 
better with large text sizes. Also, the study modelled the 
specific linguistic features of the Nigerian variant because 
of the motivation for the study; however, modelling the 
linguistic features of each of the dialects under 
consideration could have produced a better performance of 
the model. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Based on the finding of this study, it is recommended that 
researchers in technology should exploit the results of 
studies in the humanities in general and languages of 
communication specifically to enable the optimization of 
technology to solve human problems such as the forensic 
determination of the origin of scam mail through linguistic 
analyses.  There should be more research in the creation of 
text corpora in Nigeria. This is necessary because the 
availability of corpora will go a long way in helping 
researchers to carry out statistical language modelling of 
Nigerian text more readily. Also law enforcement agencies 
of each country, in particular Nigeria, should create a 
database of investigated fraudulent mails, with contents 
stored and tagged appropriately with the criminals’ 
profiles. Such data can be useful in investigating 
transnational digital criminal offences by applying the 
proposed statistical language modelling technique. 
Finally, it is recommended that governmental, non-
governmental and education sectors in Nigeria should 
provide seminars and training on more profitable use of the 
computer technologies including the Internet and also on 
the evil of electronic scamming to the Nigerian youth. The 
information age and its numerous enabling technologies 
have come to stay, deliberate introduction of positive use 
of these devices will reduce their possible negative uses. 
6. Conclusions 
Based on the findings of the study, it could be concluded 
that linguistic cues have potentials of being used for 
investigating transnational digital breaches if properly 
exploited. More research effort in this area, particularly in 
the deliberate storage of annotated electronic texts from 
different countries of the world could serve as a useful 
resource if a need arises to profile the country source of a 
controversial anonymous text. It could also be concluded 
that electronic scam mail problem cannot be pinned down 
to Nigeria as believed generally, though Nigeria could be 
one of the countries that are prominent in authoring such 
mails as revealed by the study.  
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Abstract
As the popularity of the Android platform grows, the number of malicious apps targeting this platform grows along with it. Accordingly,
as the number of malicious apps increases, so too does the need for an automated system which can effectively detect and classify these
apps and their families. This paper presents a new system for classifying malware by leveraging the text strings present in an app’s
binary files. This approach was tested using over 5,000 apps from 14 different malware families and was able to classify samples with
over 99% accuracy while maintaining a false positive rate of 2.0%.
Keywords: Mobile Malware, Android, String analysis
1. Introduction
The rising popularity of the Android platform has led to an
increase in observed malware, as much as 391% from 2013
to 2014 (Pulse Secure Mobile Threat Center, 2015). This
unprecedented increase is often associated with the inherit
openness of the Android platform, and the corresponding
lack of security measures to prevent potential abuse.
Consequently, a significant amount of research attention
has focused on exploring the nature of malware applica-
tions and developing techniques for their detection. A wide
range of malware detection approaches have been intro-
duced, from generic methods such as RiskRanker (Grace
et al., 2012a), DroidRanger (Zhou et al., 2012b), and
Drebin (Arp et al., 2014), to more specialized methods of-
fering detection of repackaging (Crussell et al., 2013; Gon-
zalez et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2013) and privacy viola-
tions (Enck et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013). Keeping up
with the growing prevalence of Android malware, the ex-
isting studies focus on either a complex multi-feature anal-
ysis capable of providing insight into a malware sample
(e.g., DroidSafe (Gordon et al., 2015)), or a large-scale bi-
nary classification identifying malicious and benign sam-
ples during the triage stage.
With the increasing amount and complexity of malware, in
triaging it is beneficial to employ methods that do not rely
on sophisticated analyses, and are capable of providing in-
sight into the malicious functionality represented by a mal-
ware app.
Since core functionality is shared by samples of the same
malware family, identification of the malware family that
a sample belongs to is the first step in understanding and
assessing malware impact and potential damage.
In this work, we propose a machine-learning based ap-
proach for the detection of Android malware through anal-
ysis of unreferenced, hidden strings present in Android ex-
ecutables. In general, strings have multiple uses in Android
binaries, including referencing code components based on
class or methods’ names. Prior research has focused mostly
on analysis of the code portions of Android executables
(i.e., .dex files) referenced through corresponding strings.
Since this is typical and therefore expected code invocation
method, it is commonly employed in reverse engineering
of Android applications (commonly referred to as apps).
Leveraging this, malware authors often avoid detection by
doing indirect code invocation by placing code in unrefer-
enced strings. In this work, we propose to explore these
components. Specifically, we investigate the role of strings
found within an Android executable, but not referenced by
the code.
We evaluate the proposed method with a dataset
made available through The Android Malware Genome
project (Zhou and Jiang, 2012), and a collection of over
4,000 benign apps retrieved from Google Play market. Our
findings using this novel approach based on unreferenced
strings show that this is an efficient alternative to prior
approaches to malware classification. Our best approach
achieves 99.3% accuracy, and a false positive rate of just
0.5%, for malware detection, and 99.2% accuracy with a
false positive rate of 2.0% for malware family classifica-
tion.
We further contrast our approach against the one using all
strings. Our experiments show that using only a small set
of unreferenced string features, we are able to effectively
identify a suspicious app maintaining the same high accu-
racy as with all strings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we present
related work in Section 2. Our system design is described
in Section 3. A detailed description of the features used
for classification are outlined in Section 4. We describe
our experimental setup in Section 5. We present results in
Section 6. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 7.
2. Related Work
In recent years the area of mobile security has seen exten-
sive growth and improvement. A broad overview of charac-
teristics of mobile malware, and approaches to its detection,
has been given by Zhou et al. (2012), Polla et al. (2013), and
Alzahrani et al. (2014).
The resource-constrained environment of mobile platforms
presents significant challenges to the detection of malware.
As a result, features that detection techniques rely on play a
critical role for the accuracy of malware detection. The fea-
tures commonly used in existing classification studies can
be grouped into two categories: dynamic features derived
from an app’s behaviour during runtime, and static features,
extracted from an app itself.
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Systems that use dynamic analysis, such as
RiskRanker (Grace et al., 2012b), focus on an app’s
behaviour while running, typically monitoring system calls
made by the app. CopperDroid (Tam et al., 2015) and
DroidScope (Yan and Yin, 2012) are examples of tech-
niques that utilize dynamic features at a host level (e.g.,
system calls). Arora et al. (2014) focused on network-level
features extracted from app behaviour.
Techniques that employ static analysis target the files that
are packaged with an application. This eliminates the need
to execute the app in order to detect any malicious in-
tent. The majority of systems that utilize static analysis
have focused on two types of packaged files: AndroidMan-
ifest.xml — which holds the app’s metadata — and exe-
cutable files. App permissions contained in AndroidMan-
ifest.xml have been explored by several studies, includ-
ing DroidRanger (Zhou et al., 2012b), Drebin (Arp et al.,
2014), and Auditor (Talha et al., 2015).
Static features extracted from executables often require ad-
ditional preprocessing, and are commonly used in studies
in the form of opcode or bytecode n-grams. For instance,
Wolfe et al. (2014) analyze the bytecode n-grams extracted
from Android binaries. Juxtapp (Hanna et al., 2013) eval-
uates code similarity based on opcode n-grams extracted
from selected packages of the disassembled .dex file. Sim-
ilarly, DroidMOSS (Zhou et al., 2012a) evaluates app sim-
ilarity using fuzzy hashes constructed based on a series of
opcodes. DroidKin (Gonzalez et al., 2014) detects unique
apps by analyzing the similarity of opcode n-grams and
metadata of apps.
In contrast to these previous studies, we propose a novel
form of static analysis based specifically on features de-
rived from the unreferenced strings contained within an ex-
ecutable.
3. Android String Analysis
An Android application package (APK) file, is a com-
pressed folder that contains a variety of files including an
executable .dex file; a manifest file (AndroidManifest.xml)
that describes the content of the package; and resources
files (e.g., image and sound files). The Dalvik executable
file, or simply .dex file, is a binary that results from compil-
ing the app’s Java source code. As illustrated by Figure 1,
this file is partitioned into a number of sections that describe
aspects of the structure of the file.
Among these sections are several identifier lists that con-
tain offsets pointing to the corresponding entries in the
data section. As such, the string identifiers list (i.e., the
string ids section) provides offsets to all strings used by
the .dex file. These strings are used for internal naming
— e.g., class, field, or local variable names — and to ref-
erence constant objects specified in the source code (e.g.,
string literals). The other identifier sections — type ids,
proto ids, field ids, method ids, and class defs — may also
contain references to the string identifiers list. For example,
a class named myclass will have a corresponding entry in
the string identifier section pointing to the actual string my-
class.
This structure is defined in a formal specification of the
layout of .dex executable files guiding the development of
Figure 1: The structure of a DEX file.
Android apps.1 Although app development must follow
the suggested guidelines, there are a number of techniques
that enable parts of code to be hidden in an Android exe-
cutable (Apvrille, 2012; Apvrille, 2013). The main premise
of these techniques is to place the code inside the data sec-
tion while avoiding it being referenced by class and method
index lists. Since these lists are typically used to invoke the
methods and classes, this prevents reverse engineering of an
app and allows malware apps to bypass anti-malware scans.
The majority of prior research has focused on the code sec-
tion of the officially documented .dex structure. In contrast,
we explore the text components. As such we differentiate
between strings that are pointed to by any of the other iden-
tifier sections, denoted as “referenced strings”, and all other
strings referred to as “unreferenced strings”. Referenced
strings can be viewed as a part of functional app code. They
are linked to other identifier lists and thus, for example,
can represent classes, methods, or data structures. On the
other hand, the data section also contains “unreferenced”
strings that are only referenced by the string offset list, and
thus carry textual information, e.g., string literals. In prior
work on malware analysis this part of the code has not car-
ried the same weight as the functional portion. However,
these unreferenced strings often carry hidden or interest-
ing information. For example, hardcoded URLs and email
addresses (represented as strings) are common in malware
apps, and would occur amongst the unreferenced strings.
As such, analysis of unreferenced strings can potentially
indicate malicious activity embedded in Android apps.
In this paper we investigate the impact of unreferenced
strings found within the Android executable on the tasks
1https://source.android.com/devices/tech/
dalvik/dex-format.html. Accessed: 2016-02-11
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Figure 2: The sequence of analysis in the proposed
approach.
of identifying malicious Android apps, and classifying An-
droid apps with respect to malware family.
3.1. String analysis
To investigate the role of unreferenced strings in malware
analysis, the proposed system encompasses several steps:
string extraction, pruning, feature vector generation, and fi-
nally assessment, as shown in Figure 2. The initial steps
of string extraction and pruning primarily focus on prepro-
cessing activities that are necessary to allow our system
to carry out feature vector generation. These vectors then
serve as the basis for the following classification and anal-
ysis.
In the strings extraction step, for each app under analysis,
our system recursively unpacks and extracts all .dex files
found in both the root APK, as well as within all sub-APKs.
All of these .dex files contribute to the final string data as-
sociated with the root app. The strings of each .dex file are
extracted by traversing the string ids list and collecting all
strings present in data section.
The pruning step then prunes these strings to only include
the unreferenced strings. This is accomplished by travers-
ing the 5 other identifier lists — type, proto, field, method,
and class — and then removing strings that are referenced
by these lists. The resulting unreferenced strings therefore
consist solely of non-executable code, such as string liter-
als and local variable names, as well as strings from hidden
executable parts of code not referenced through identifier
lists. These remaining strings then form the basis for fea-
ture vectors.
To generate feature vectors in the feature vector generation
step, we consider word-level string n-gram features (de-
scribed in the following section) derived from the unrefer-
enced strings. As a point of comparison, we also consider
feature vectors generated from all strings (i.e., referenced
and unreferenced strings). To form these feature vectors,
we simply omit the pruning step.
In contrast to our proposed approach, malware analysis is
typically conducted at the bytecode or opcode level. Op-
codes are generally beneficial in representing the low-level
semantics of the code, while bytecode is seen as the com-
plete representation of the code at a low-level. As a further
important point of comparison, we therefore also experi-
ment with opcode and bytecode n-grams (also described in
the Section 4.). For these opcode and bytecode features, the
strings extraction and pruning phases do not apply.
Feature vectors are generated for each app in a large collec-
tion of Android apps, each of which is known to be either a
malicious app, or a benign (non-malware) app. In the case
of malware, the malware family is also known. These fea-
ture vectors are used to train supervised classifiers to iden-
tify malicious Android apps, and classify Android apps ac-
cording to their malware family. After training, in the mal-
ware classification step the malware status and family of
a new app is assessed based on its classification under the
previously-trained classifier model.
4. String features
To preserve the semantics of the original strings, the string
features used in the proposed approach were extracted at
the word level. They were then processed into n-grams of
varying lengths. An n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n
items. In the case of word level n-grams these items are
words in a sentence. For example, given the sentence Good
morning John Doe., three 2-gram tokens can be made:
1. Good morning
2. morning John
3. John Doe.
Note that the tokenization used here was to split a string
based on whitespace; therefore in this case the period at the
end of the sentence is a part of the word Doe.
In the feature vector generation process, each extracted
string was written onto a separate line, so that these word
level n-grams could be line bounded. This was done to
ensure that n-grams did not contain words from different
lines. Since the strings are held in lexicographical order, ad-
jacent strings are not necessarily related. As such, n-grams
spanning multiple lines would contain word sequences that
are not associated, that is, words that are not a part of the
same original string. These n-grams would contain mean-
ingless relationships, and would thus add noise to the fea-
ture set, which could hinder classification.
4.1. String Feature Extraction
Each app was represented using both token (n-gram) fre-
quencies and token frequency-inverse document frequency
(tf-idf) weights. Frequency vectors contain the number of
times a term (i.e., an n-gram) occurs in a given document
(where in our case a “document” is the collection of strings
extracted from a given app); tf-idf assigns lower weights to
terms that occur in many documents, and is calculated as
follows:
tf-idfi,d = fi,d ∗ log
(
N
ni
)
(1)
where fi,d is the frequency of term i in document d, N is
the total number of documents, and ni is the number of
documents that term i occurs in at least once.
These tokens were extracted by grouping the strings on
each line into word level n-grams, with n ranging from
1 to 4. Any lines that had fewer than n words were ig-
nored for that feature set. The analysis of string sizes across
our dataset showed that only a few strings had more than 4
words (Figure 3). As such in this work we capped n-gram
length at 4.
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Table 1: Examples of n-gram features. <LB> is the line boundary token.
Line Text 1-grams 2-grams 3-grams 4-grams
mThread=
mThread= <LB> mThread= <LB> mThread= <LB>
mThread= <LB>
wrote final 256;
wrote <LB> wrote <LB> wrote final <LB> wrote final 256;
final wrote final wrote final 256; wrote final 256; <LB>
256; final 256; final 256; <LB>
256; <LB>
Figure 3: The distribution of string lengths in the dataset.
If n > 1 then a unique line boundary token was added to
the start and end of each line. This ensured that all lines
contained at least 3 words (including the line boundary to-
kens), thereby reducing the number of lines that were ig-
nored for having fewer than n words, and therefore making
more information available in the feature vectors. Adding
line boundary tokens also serves to identify the words and
n-grams that occur at the beginning and end of strings. This
could be potentially important information in that a string
that begins with, for example, warning or error could mean
something very different than a string that simply contains
these words.
Line boundary tokens were not added to the 1-gram fea-
tures. The frequency of these special line boundary tokens
in this case would be equivalent to counting the number
of strings in the app. As this information is not directly
encoded by the other n-gram features, it was also avoided
here.
An example of the proposed feature extraction method is
shown in Table 1. Note the following important properties:
• There are no<LB> tokens for the 1-gram feature sets.
• There were no 4-gram tokens for the first string,
“mThread=”. This is because, even with the line
boundary tokens, the string only contained 3 words.
As such, it was ignored for not having at least n = 4
words in it.
• The words in the 2 and 3-gram tokens were in the same
order in which they appeared in the original string, and
the words were always adjacent. That is, the 2-gram
Table 2: Distribution of Android APK files across malware
families
Malware Family File Count
1 ADRD 22
2 AnserverBot 187
3 BaseBridge 122
4 DroidDreamLight 46
5 DroidKungFu1 34
6 DroidKungFu2 30
7 DroidKungFu3 309
8 DroidKungFu4 96
9 Geinimi 69
10 GoldDream 47
11 KMin 52
12 Pjapps 58
13 YZHC 22
14 Other 166
15 Benign GooglePlay apps 4,574
Total 5,834
feature set did not contain tokens such as “final wrote”
or “wrote 256;”.
5. Experimental setup
5.1. Data
To evaluate the performance of the proposed malware anal-
ysis approach we employed a standard benchmark dataset
produced by The Android Malware Genome project (Zhou
and Jiang, 2012). This dataset consists of 1,260 malware
apps. We also required a collection of benign (i.e., non-
malware) apps for evaluation purposes. We performed a
large-scale study of the top Android applications retrieved
from Google Play market between September 2014 and
January 2015. These apps were inspected by ESET anti-
virus scanner to detect the presence of malware. All mali-
cious apps were removed from the dataset. This resulted in
4,574 benign (i.e., non-malware) GooglePlay apps which
were used in this study.
The apps retrieved from Google play market and The An-
droid Malware Genome project were used for classification
experiments. This dataset of 5,834 apps is detailed in Ta-
ble 2.
Some families in this dataset ended up with only a few sam-
ples, making classification and validation of results diffi-
cult. As such we grouped low frequency families into an
“Other” class. The app distribution among the families had
a convenient gap between families with 16 and 22 samples.
As such, all families that had fewer than 17 files were con-
sidered to be low frequency, and placed in the ‘Other’ class.
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Thereby resulting in 15 distinct malware families, including
the benign GooglePlay apps.
5.2. Feature extraction
Opcodes for each DEX file were extracted using dexdump,
a disassembler tool that is a part of the Android SDK.
Opcode operands were discarded as their variability typi-
cally results in noise and excessively sparse feature vectors
which makes classification more difficult.
Each app was represented using opcode n-grams, where n
ranged from 1 to 4, the same range of n considered for
string n-grams. Opcode n-grams were DEX file bounded
(as opposed to line bounded in the case of string n-grams).
A special DEX file boundary token was included for the op-
code n-grams for n > 1, for similar reasons as the inclusion
of the line boundary token in the case of string n-grams.
The bytecode features were obtained by reading each byte
of each DEX file. Since DEX files start with the magic
number “dex”,2 thus acting as built-in boundary tokens, ad-
ditional boundary tokens were not used. Each app was rep-
resented using bytecode n-grams, where n ranged from 1
to 2.
5.3. Classification and Baseline
We implemented the proposed approach in Python, using
the scikit-learn library (Pedregosa et al., 2011). In prelimi-
nary experiments we considered a variety of classifiers in-
cluding k-nearest neighbors, multinomial naive Bayes, lo-
gistic regression, and a linear support vector machine. The
linear SVM (Fan et al., 2008) had the best performance, or
close to it, in terms of both accuracy and false positive rate
on malware detection and family classification. We there-
fore focus on, and report results for, the linear SVM classi-
fier for the remainder of the paper.
In the case of the datasets used in this study, and in most
application marketplaces, benign applications outnumber
malicious applications. In a case such as this where the
classes (benign and malicious) are imbalanced, a very naive
strategy of simply selecting the most frequent class can
perform very well, particularly in terms of accuracy. We
therefore also report a majority class baseline — referred
to as “Baseline” — that classifies all samples as the most
common class in the training data. In our experiments this
strategy will classify all samples as benign. This baseline
provides a reference against which we can interpret the re-
sults of other methods. Crucially, it is not the only ap-
proach against which we compare our string-based classi-
fication approaches; we also consider approaches based on
opcodes.
6. Experimental Results
In our experimental study we focused on analysis of:
1. Binary classification: classification of a sample as ei-
ther a malicious or benign app. This type of classifica-
tion is also referred to as malware detection.
2https://source.android.com/devices/tech/
dalvik/dex-format.html Accessed: 2016-02-11
2. Malware family classification: where the samples
were classified as one of 15 different classes, 14 of
which are malware families and 1 class representing
benign apps. These families, and the number of files
in them, are listed in Table 2.
3. Unreferenced strings vs all strings: The classifica-
tion performance using unreferenced strings was con-
trasted against that using all strings (i.e., referenced
and unreferenced).
4. Classification with selected string features: classifica-
tion of apps based on selected, highly-informative fea-
tures.
All classification experiments were repeated 5 times, each
using stratified 5-fold cross validation.
6.1. Unreferenced strings vs all strings
We compared the performance of the linear SVM when us-
ing all of the strings versus using only the unreferenced
strings. These results are shown in Table 3. The results are,
overall, quite similar. For example, the best accuracy for
malware detection (“Binary”) is 99.5% for all strings, and
99.3% for unreferenced strings. For malware family classi-
fication there is a similarly small difference in terms of the
best accuracy for the all strings and unreferenced strings ap-
proaches. That the all strings approach does slightly better
does not come as a surprise; retaining all strings provides
more information to the classifier. However, with unrefer-
enced strings, we are able to drastically cut the total number
of strings that are examined (from roughly 127 million to
46 million) while maintaining a similar accuracy.
The performance results of the linear SVM classifier us-
ing only the unreferenced strings for malware detection and
malware family classification are shown in Table 4. Un-
surprisingly, all n-gram classification strategies performed
significantly better than the baseline in all cases, with the
exception of the false positive rate for malware detection
(Binary).
For both malware detection and family classification, we
see an increase in performance for all metrics when in-
creasing the size of the word grams from 1 to 2, and again
when increasing from 2 to 3. This is likely caused by the
increased contextual information that is carried by higher
order n-grams. However, there is a clear drop in per-
formance for 4-grams. Two factors could contribute to
this. Data sparsity could be an important factor, because
many 4-grams will be unique. Furthermore, the system ig-
nores strings that contain fewer than n words after padding
with line boundary tokens. The 4-gram strategy ignored
over 30M lines throughout the dataset. One possibility
to overcome this would be to pad lines with additional
word boundary tokens; however, this would substantially
increase the number of features in this model, making clas-
sification much more computationally intensive.
The best strategy for both malware detection and family
classification was to use 3-gram word counts. This strat-
egy was able to achieve near perfect (> 99%) accuracy for
both malware detection and malware family classification
while maintaining a low false positive rate. Moreover, the
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Table 3: Accuracy (Acc), macro-averaged precision (Prec) and recall (Rec), and false positive rate (FPR) for malware
detection (Binary) and malware family classification (Family) using a linear SVM with features based on all strings (All)
and just the unreferenced strings (Unref).
Strategy Acc Prec Rec FPRAll Unref All Unref All Unref All Unref
Binary
1-gram word freq. 99.3% 98.8% 97.8% 96.5% 99.0% 98.1% 0.63% 0.99%
2-gram word freq. 99.5% 99.2% 98.6% 98.0% 99.1% 98.5% 0.40% 0.56%
3-gram word freq. 98.6% 99.3% 96.8% 98.1% 96.6% 98.6% 0.87% 0.50%
4-gram word freq. 98.5% 98.6% 96.7% 96.9% 96.5% 96.7% 0.89% 0.85%
1-gram word tf-idf 99.4% 99.3% 99.3% 99.4% 98.0% 97.2% 0.18% 2.8%
2-gram word tf-idf 99.3% 99.2% 99.3% 99.3% 97.3% 97.2% 0.19% 2.8%
3-gram word tf-idf 98.8% 99.2% 99.2% 99.3% 95.0% 96.9% 0.21% 3.1%
4-gram word tf-idf 98.6% 98.6% 99.1% 99.1% 94.5% 94.5% 0.25% 0.24%
Family
1-gram word freq. 99.0% 98.5% 97.4% 96.7% 97.2% 96.5% 88.6% 2.7%
2-gram word freq. 99.5% 99.0% 98.4% 98.3% 98.4% 97.5% 94.9% 1.6%
3-gram word freq. 98.2% 99.2% 95.9% 98.6% 95.2% 98.0% 4.8% 2.0%
4-gram word freq. 98.2% 98.4% 94.9% 96.2% 94.9% 95.5% 5.1% 4.5%
1-gram word tf-idf 98.5% 96.6% 98.6% 98.7% 93.3% 94.4% 6.7% 5.6%
2-gram word tf-idf 98.3% 98.7% 98.0% 98.6% 92.4% 94.9% 7.6% 5.1%
3-gram word tf-idf 97.5% 98.4% 96.0% 97.9% 88.6% 93.2% 11.4% 6.8%
4-gram word tf-idf 97.1% 97.1% 93.5% 93.5% 85.0% 85.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Table 4: Accuracy (Acc), macro-averaged precision (Prec) and recall (Rec), and false positive rate (FPR) for malware
detection (Binary) and malware family classification (Family) using a linear SVM with features based unreferenced
strings, bytecodes, and opcodes.
Strategy Binary FamilyAcc Prec Rec FPR Acc Prec Rec FPR
Baseline 78.4% 0.00% 78.4% 93.3%
1-gram word freq. 98.8% 96.5% 98.1% 0.99% 98.5% 96.7% 96.5% 3.5%
2-gram word freq. 99.2% 98.0% 98.5% 0.56% 99.0% 98.3% 97.5% 2.5%
3-gram word freq. 99.3% 98.2% 98.6% 0.50% 99.2% 96.2% 95.5% 2.0%
4-gram word freq. 98.6% 96.9% 96.7% 0.85% 98.4% 98.6% 98.0% 4.5%
1-gram word tf-idf 99.3% 99.4% 97.2% 2.8% 96.6% 98.7% 94.4% 5.6%
2-gram word tf-idf 99.2% 99.3% 97.2% 2.8% 98.7% 98.6% 94.9% 5.1%
3-gram word tf-idf 99.2% 99.3% 96.9% 3.1% 98.4% 97.9% 93.2% 6.8%
4-gram word tf-idf 98.6% 99.1% 94.5% 0.24% 97.1% 93.5% 85.0% 14.99%
1-gram bytecode freq. 85.6% 70.1% 70.7% 10.29% 74.8% 24.7% 21.4% 78.58%
2-gram bytecode freq. 92.3% 83.5% 83.0% 5.09% 83.0% 39.7% 29.7% 70.26%
1-gram bytecode tf-idf 79.0% 93.0% 3.14% 0.06% 78.4% 7.0% 6.8% 93.23%
2-gram bytecode tf-idf 94.1% 86.8% 86.0% 3.62% 82.2% 19.2% 14.5% 85.53%
1-gram opcode freq. 97.9% 95.0% 95.3% 1.38% 95.9% 84.7% 85.3% 14.71%
2-gram opcode freq. 98.1% 95.0% 96.4% 1.42% 96.7% 90.1% 87.9% 12.07%
3-gram opcode freq. 98.2% 95.0% 96.8% 1.39% 97.4% 94.0% 91.5% 8.52%
1-gram opcode tf-idf 98.5% 96.0% 97.3% 1.12% 95.7% 92.4% 77.0% 22.99%
2-gram opcode tf-idf 99.3% 98.1% 98.7% 0.52% 97.9% 95.2% 89.7% 10.32%
3-gram opcode tf-idf 99.2% 98.0% 98.4% 0.56% 97.9% 95.2% 90.7% 9.28%
accuracy, precision, and recall of this method is better than
that for any of the classifiers using the more-conventional
bytecode or opcode n-gram features.
6.2. Feature Selection
Since anti-malware vendors are forced to maintain large
and ever-growing numbers of signatures for malware de-
tection, it is important that any malware detection and clas-
sification methods be able to use a minimal number of fea-
tures. As such, we tested the proposed method using only
the 50 highest ranked 3-gram tokens, extracted from the un-
referenced strings, for each family.
These 3-grams were ranked by training a linear SVM using
the one-vs-rest classification strategy. Features that have
high coefficients have more of an impact on how the linear
SVM classifies a given sample. Therefore, the 50 tokens
that had the highest coefficient for each family, are equiva-
lent to the 50 highest ranked tokens for each of those fami-
lies. We present examples of the top-5 ranked 3-grams for
selected families in Table 5. By using only these 50 strings
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Table 5: The 5 most important 3-grams when used to classify selected malware families. Note that <LB> is the line
boundary token and that the whitespace between the words was removed to reduce memory consumption when training.
Class Rank Token
Benign apps
1 <LB> this <LB>
2 <LB> accessFlags <LB>
3 <LB> android.intent.action.VIEW <LB>
4 <LB> string <LB>
5 <LB> com.android.vending <LB>
DroidKungFu2
1 <LB> /system/etc/.rild cfg <LB>
2 <LB> /system/etc/.dhcpcd <LB>
3 <LB> /WebView.db <LB>
4 <LB> WebView.db.init <LB>
5 <LB> /secbino <LB>
DroidKungFu3
1 <LB> /system/etc/.rild cfg <LB>
2 <LB> /system/etc/.dhcpcd <LB>
3 <LB> -1 <LB>
4 <LB> sysName <LB>
5 <LB> 4/system/bin/chmod <LB>
GoldDream
1 <LB> Content-Disposition:form-data; <LB>
2 <LB> SmsDataType <LB>
3 <LB> zjphonecall.txt <LB>
4 <LB> lebar.gicp.net <LB>
5 <LB> ws v < LB >
per family, we were able to reduce the number of features
to 728.3 These features suggest that unreferenced strings
that contain filenames, URLs, and source code are highly
informative as to malware families.
Further manual analysis of selected string n-grams also
confirmed our initial hypothesis that unreferenced strings
present a narrow more focused view of malware behavior
and bear interesting information. For example, GoldDream
Trojan app uploaded stolen information to a remote server.
The URL of this server ’lebar.gicp.net’ became visible only
through analysis of unreferenced strings (see Table 5). Our
analysis also revealed that strings often carry code snip-
pets that contain additional functionality. For example,
javascript might be embedded as a string to be executed
during the runtime of an app. The use of databases and
consequently the presence of sql queries was also prevalent
among malware apps.
In preliminary experiments considering this feature selec-
tion strategy, the accuracy obtained by using only these
728 features was 96.2%, which is only 3 percentage points
lower than using all of the unreferenced strings. However,
the false positive rate went up to 13.9%, an increase of
11.9 percentage points. Nevertheless, this feature selection
strategy managed to reduce the length of the feature vec-
tors from over 8 million to just 728, while still maintaining
relatively high accuracy.
6.3. Discussion
The proposed method of classifying Android malware is
rather promising due to several reasons. As opposed to
the majority of existing malware classification techniques
that rely on a large set of features, the proposed approach
requires only 50 features per malware family. This is espe-
cially appealing to anti-malware vendors that are constantly
3Because some tokens were indicative of multiple families, the
number is slightly less than the number of families ∗ 50.
forced to keep up with an ever-growing number of signa-
tures for malware detection.
The proposed method exhibits very good filtering capabil-
ity overall. Our results are especially attractive since it
seems to be possible to extract a small set of string features
that can effectively identify a suspicious app and further
characterize the majority of malware samples within a fam-
ily. This approach can complement the existing techniques
and significantly simplify the triaging stage in automated
analysis tools.
7. Conclusion
The amount of malware targeting the Android mobile plat-
form is on the rise, as such, the need for an effective auto-
mated system to detect and classify malware and the differ-
ent malware families is crucial. This study presented such
a solution, through the use of text strings extracted from
the DEX files of an android application. The proposed sys-
tem of using a linear SVM with line-bounded word-level
3-grams was able to classify malware families with an ac-
curacy of 99.2% while maintaining a false positive rate of
just 2.0%.
There are multiple opportunities for future work. First, we
will test the feature selection strategy on a dataset of obfus-
cated apps, as well as attempt to improve the string extrac-
tion process by using various natural language processing
techniques such as stemming and case folding. Finally, we
plan to use the datasets from this study to develop an en-
semble classification system which utilizes the string, byte-
code, and opcode features.
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Abstract
Privacy policies written in natural language are the predominant method that operators of websites and online services use to
communicate privacy practices to their users. However, these documents are infrequently read by Internet users, due in part to the length
and complexity of the text. These factors also inhibit the efforts of regulators to assess privacy practices or to enforce standards. One
proposed approach to improving the status quo is to use a combination of methods from crowdsourcing, natural language processing,
and machine learning to extract details from privacy policies and present them in an understandable fashion. We sketch out this vision
and describe our ongoing work to bring it to fruition. Further, we discuss challenges associated with bridging the gap between the
contents of privacy policy text and website users’ abilities to understand those policies. These challenges are motivated by the rich
interconnectedness of the problems as well as the broader impact of helping Internet users understand their privacy choices. They could
also provide a basis for competitions that use the annotated corpus introduced in this paper.
Keywords:Privacy, Internet, annotation, corpus, crowdsourcing.
1. Introduction
Websites’ privacy policies are the common (if not nearly
pervasive) mechanism by which website operators inform
users how their data will be collected, protected, shared,
or otherwise processed. However, studies have shown that
the average Internet user reads few of the privacy policies
of websites they visit (Federal Trade Commission, 2012),
would need a substantial amount of time to do so, and even
then would have difficulty understanding what those poli-
cies mean (McDonald and Cranor, 2008). Moreover, the
length and complexity of these documents are a hindrance
to policy regulators who are tasked with assessing and en-
forcing compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.
These problems have led to the assessment that the current
“notice and choice” model of online privacy is broken (Rei-
denberg et al., 2014).
These impractical aspects of privacy policies pose a ripe
challenge that several efforts have tried to resolve. Some,
most notably P3P (W3C, 2006), have relied on voluntary
cooperation from website operators to provide formally-
specified data on their privacy practices, which are pre-
sented to users or applied to browser settings such as cookie
management. However, website operators have been hesi-
tant to supply their privacy policies in a machine-readable
format, to the extent that P3P has not been widely adopted.
Other efforts, such as Terms of Service; Didn’t Read (Roy,
2016), have relied chiefly on volunteers to annotate pri-
vacy policies. This approach has limits as well, as it relies
solely on the attentiveness and dedication of its community
to function.
An opportunity exists for language technologies to pro-
vide some degree of automation to “bridge the gap” be-
tween privacy policies and their audiences. In some ways
this is a familiar problem domain; natural language pro-
cessing on legal text is an active area of research and the
legal community has begun to recognize it as well (Mahler,
2015). However, the salience of the problem to the average
Internet user’s experience makes it unique among applica-
tions of natural language processing to legal text. Its timeli-
ness to rising concerns about digital privacy is also a strong
motivating factor.
We report on the progress of the Usable Privacy Pol-
icy Project, an ongoing effort to use crowdsourcing, natural
language processing, and machine learning to extract key
information from privacy policy text and present that infor-
mation to Internet users and policy regulators. We outline
our efforts to enlist human annotators—both crowdwork-
ers and expert readers—to gather information from privacy
policy text. We have applied a fine-grained policy annota-
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Figure 1: The structure of our approach for processing web-
site privacy policies.
tion procedure to a set of 115 privacy policies (267K words)
to label them with a total of 23K data practices, 128K prac-
tice attributes, and 103K annotated text spans. This corpus
of privacy policies is unprecedented in its size and detail,
and we plan to release it to the research community to en-
courage exploration of this topic. Finally, we describe sev-
eral research challenges for automating the annotation and
analysis of privacy policies. These problems are motivated
by the status quo in usable online privacy and the potential
broader impacts of improving language technologies.
2. Making Privacy Policies Usable
The Usable Privacy Policy Project1 (Sadeh et al., 2013)
is an NSF-funded Frontier Project with the goals of auto-
matically or semi-automatically extracting key details from
privacy policy text, presenting those details to Internet users
in formats that respond to their needs, and enabling large-
scale privacy policy analysis to inform regulators and key
policymakers. We concentrate below on the aspects of the
project that are most relevant to language technologies, to
motivate the challenges we wish to share with this research
community.
Figure 1 illustrates our overall approach to processing
privacy policy text. We assume no cooperation on the part
of website operators; thus our pipeline begins with website
privacy policies as they are generally presented to users, in
natural language with some HTML markup. Each privacy
policy is downloaded, sanitized to remove extraneous page
elements, and then (if appropriate for later stages) divided
into segments that roughly correspond to paragraphs. Pri-
vacy policies or policy segments are then annotated with
information on privacy practices using a combination of
human annotators and automatic methods currently under
development. We are improving this stage incrementally,
by first gathering data from policies with the help of human
annotators and then using that data to train models that pre-
dict aspects of policy contents. Over time, we expect to
increasingly automate the annotation process, limiting the
need for human annotators to tasks where human judge-
ment is strictly necessary.
Finally, the results of the annotation process must be
presented to Internet users and policy regulators in ways
that are responsive to their needs. Our project is developing
browser plugins that will show users the privacy practices
1https://www.usableprivacy.org
of websites as they visit them. This is inspired in part by
prior work on privacy nutrition labels (Kelley et al., 2009)
and privacy profiles (Liu et al., 2014), recognizing the sub-
stantial challenges to showing users information about pri-
vacy practices. Our team has also developed a data explo-
ration website to showcase the results of some of our an-
notations. We introduce this site in the next section. The
intended outcomes of this project include a transfer of tech-
nologies and analysis results to industry, regulators, and
policymakers, to ensure a lasting impact of the work.
3. Collecting Information from Privacy
Policies
We have taken a two-pronged approach to human an-
notation of privacy policy contents, by creating a question-
based annotation tool for crowdworkers and a fine-grained
annotation tool for expert annotators. We describe both be-
low and explain the future intersection of these approaches.
3.1. Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing is a well-recognized method of solving
problems that are difficult for computers but easy for hu-
mans (Quinn and Bederson, 2011). However, Internet users
interpret privacy policies only with great difficulty (Jensen
and Potts, 2004; McDonald and Cranor, 2008), potentially
ruling out crowdsourcing for this problem. To overcome
this limitation, we investigated the accuracy of crowdwork-
ers’ answers to questions about privacy policies when mul-
tiple workers’ answers are aggregated.
Figure 2 shows the interface of our privacy policy anno-
tation tool for crowdworkers. For the task, crowdworkers
read the text of a privacy policy, answered nine multiple-
choice questions about the privacy practices that it de-
scribed, and highlighted the text that answered each ques-
tion. Ten crowdworkers completed this task for each pol-
icy, and we experimented with aggregating their answers
for each question using a confidence threshold: if the frac-
tion of annotators who chose the most popular answer to
a question about a privacy policy was no less than a spec-
ified percentage, that answer was designated the crowd’s
answer. If the most popular answer did not meet the per-
centage, then it was deemed that the crowd had not pro-
duced an answer. Varying the threshold thus permitted tun-
ing for only high agreement answers (high threshold) or for
broad coverage (low threshold). Separately, we also exper-
imented with using a logistic regression model to predict
which paragraphs were relevant to each question. We high-
lighted these paragraphs for crowdworkers and measured
their impact on workers’ accuracy, speed, and confidence.
Our results showed that requiring a high level of agree-
ment produced relatively high accuracy while retaining
substantial coverage (Wilson et al., 2016). For example,
setting the threshold at 80% agreement resulted in crowd
answers for 69% of question-policy pairings and 96% of
those answers matched experts’ interpretations. We also
observed a slight increase in task completion speed with the
provision of relevance highlights, without a negative im-
pact on accuracy. Moreover, in an exit survey, annotators
who used the interface with highlights expressed greater
ease with understanding legal texts than annotators who did
First Workshop on Text Analytics for Cybersecurity and Online Safety (TA-COS 2016)
36
Figure 2: The policy annotation tool for crowdworkers.
not see highlights. This suggests that the task is easier for
crowdworkers when highlights are provided, and providing
them may reduce fatigue and increase endurance for similar
labeling tasks.
3.2. Expert Annotation
The crowdworker annotation tool collected answers to
simple questions about privacy policies, and a need remains
for annotations that better capture the nuances of privacy
practices. Solving this entirely with crowdworkers is highly
complex and challenging: even after defining a sufficiently
fine-grained annotation scheme, the task is too intricate to
give to crowdworkers and interdependencies within it must
be discovered to decompose it. Thus, we created a fine-
grained annotation tool and enlisted expert workers (grad-
uate students in law) to annotate a set of privacy policies.
We are planning for an initial release of a corpus of 115 pri-
vacy policies plus annotations on the Usable Privacy Policy
Project website (URL in Footnote 1). The next steps will
be to identify annotation subtasks that can be automated
and other subtasks that are suitable for crowdsourcing.
The intent of the fine-grained annotation scheme is to
capture the relationship between the data practices (i.e., ax-
ioms about how a website user’s data is collected, shared,
or otherwise applied) intended by a privacy policy and the
specific segments of text that express those practices. Each
data practice belongs to one of ten categories that broadly
express its genus:
1. First Party Collection/Use
2. Third Party Sharing/Collection
3. User Choice/Control
4. User Access, Edit and Deletion
5. Data Retention
6. Data Security
7. Policy Change
8. Do Not Track
9. International and Specific Audiences
10. Other
Each of these ten categories is associated with a set of
attributes, and each attribute is associated with a set of po-
tential values. For example, User Choice/Control has five
attributes: Choice Type, Choice Scope, Personal Informa-
tion Type, Purpose, and User Choice. An attribute may
be required (the annotator must select a value for the at-
tribute when creating a practice) or optional (since policies
are sometimes vague). Crucially, most values are required
to be associated with a span of text in the privacy policy.
Figure 3 shows the interface of the fine-grained anno-
tation tool. Expert workers read one policy segment at a
time. To create a data practice, the annotator first selects a
category and then, for each attribute, specifies a text span
(by clicking and dragging) and a value. For example, Fig-
ure 3 shows a partly instantiated User Choice/Control prac-
tice: Opt-in is the selected value for Choice Type, and it is
associated with the highlighted span of text in the policy
fragment. A value has been selected for attribute Purpose
as well, though its text span is not shown. Values have not
yet been selected for three attributes, though the lack of an
asterisk by attribute User Type indicates it is optional.
We have collected annotations for a set of 115 website
privacy policies. Websites were selected to represent di-
verse coverage of sectors (e.g., entertainment, e-commerce,
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Figure 3: The fine-grained policy annotation tool, for expert annotators.
Figure 4: Viewing a sample policy on the data exploration site.
reference, education, etc.) and levels of popularity (as de-
termined by Alexa.com rankings). Each website was anno-
tated by three expert workers who worked independently.
The annotated corpus represents an unprecedented sur-
vey of online privacy practices as well as a unique, special-
ized language resource. In aggregate, the privacy policies
consist of 267K words, and the expert workers produced
23K data practices, 128K practice attributes, and 103K an-
notated text spans associated with those attributes. No-
tably these counts of annotations represent unconsolidated
work—i.e., from three expert workers—and their annota-
tions exhibit some variation. We are exploring several al-
ternatives for identifying and consolidating redundant prac-
tices, which is a nontrivial problem because of the complex-
ity of the annotation scheme and thus the variety of modes
of divergence.
Finally, Figure 4 is a screenshot of a data exploration
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website2 that we have created to showcase the annotations
for the set of 115 website privacy policies. The website al-
lows users to search the collection of privacy policies for
specific websites and browse the privacy practices anno-
tated by the expert workers. It also identifies the sectors
that a website belongs to, as categorized by DMOZ,3, and
allows the user to compare it to its peers in the same sector.
4. Challenges for the Research Community
The corpus of 115 annotated policies is intended to be
a resource for research in natural language processing, us-
able privacy, and policy analysis. To this end, we challenge
these research communities to investigate a family of prob-
lems related to the automated analysis of privacy policies.
These problems are well-motivated by established topics in
natural language processing as well as the difficulties of the
“notice and choice” model of online privacy in its current
form. Solving them will be progress toward helping Inter-
net users understand how their personal information is used
and what choices they can make about that usage. Addi-
tionally, policy regulators and creators will have tools to
help them monitor compliance with laws and detect trends
that require action.
A central challenge of this research direction is the
need to annotate privacy policies in a scalable, cost-efficient
manner. We have already observed how machine learning
can be used to guide human annotators’ efforts; for exam-
ple, the automatically-generated paragraph highlights made
the crowdsourcing task (Figure 2) easier for workers. We
have also performed preliminary experiments with machine
learning to determine that policy segments can be classi-
fied automatically for their relevance to practice categories
in the fine-grained annotation scheme. These are steps to-
ward a goal of limiting the need for human annotators to
small, self-contained tasks that are optimal for crowdsourc-
ing while natural language processing and machine learn-
ing take care of the bulk of the analysis. An ambitious (but
not completely unreasonable) goal will be to eliminate the
need for human annotators altogether. By producing confi-
dence ratings alongside data practice predictions, an auto-
mated system could account for its shortcomings by stating
which predictions are very likely to be correct and deferring
to crowdworkers for predictions that lack firmness.
We propose that the automatic annotation of privacy
policies with data practices is a suitable problem for a com-
petitive challenge, and the challenge will advance the state
of the art in applicable language technologies. Our corpus
of 115 annotated policies contains data that can serve as a
gold standard for evaluating solutions. The problem is de-
composable into two interrelated subproblems:
• Prediction of segment relevance to categories: Given
a segment of privacy policy text and one of the ten
practice categories, can an automated system predict
whether the segment contains a practice belonging to
the category? Similarly, can an automated system de-
limit one or more subsegments of text that correspond
with individual data practices?
2https://explore.usableprivacy.org/
3https://www.dmoz.org/ also used by Alexa.com
• Prediction of values for practice attributes: Given a
segment of policy text and the knowledge that it con-
tains a data practice in a specified category, can an au-
tomated system predict the values of the practice’s at-
tributes? Similarly, can it identify the text associated
with each of those values?
Methods from information retrieval, semantic parsing,
coreference resolution, and named entity recognition are
particularly relevant to these problems, although a function-
ing system may use a broad range of methods that we do not
immediately anticipate. A sufficiently large space exists for
potential solutions that the research community could ben-
efit from an organized challenge as part of a workshop or
similar event.
Finally, we are also actively working on or are interested
in solving several problems that the corpus will enable us
to investigate:
• Consolidation of annotations from multiple workers:
Under what criteria do a pair of non-identical data
practices produced by two annotators refer to the same
underlying axiom in the text? Criteria may be observ-
able (i.e., present in the practices’ attributes or text
spans) or latent (depending on factors such as policy
ambiguity or vagueness, which may cause two annota-
tions of an axiom to be divergent without either being
in error).
• Recombination of data practices into a cohesive body
of knowledge about a privacy policy: How do data
practices for a privacy policy relate to each other? The
answer to this is not contained chiefly in the annota-
tions. For example, two data practices may appear
to contradict each other even though they do not, be-
cause the reconciliation cannot be represented by the
annotation scheme, and thus it is absent from the an-
notations. Inconsistencies, generalizations, and impli-
cations are other examples of potential relationships
between data practices. Adding expressiveness to the
annotation scheme comes with the tradeoff of greater
complexity.
• Summarization and simplification: Can the text of a
privacy policy be shortened or reworded so that the
average Internet user can understand it? A simple test
for content equivalence is whether an annotation pro-
cedure (by humans or automated methods) produces
the same set of data practices for the simplified text
and the original text. In practice, Internet users have
already demonstrated limited patience with text-based
privacy policies, but this problem is nevertheless mo-
tivated by the broader goal of making complex texts
easier to understand.
• Optimizing the balance between human and auto-
mated methods for privacy policy annotation: Hu-
man annotators and automated annotation both have
strengths and weaknesses. The ideal combination in
an annotation system will depend on the necessary
level of confidence in the annotations and the avail-
ability of resources. These resources include human
First Workshop on Text Analytics for Cybersecurity and Online Safety (TA-COS 2016)
39
annotators, computational power, and training data to
create computational models.
• Identifying sectoral norms and outliers: Within a sec-
tor (e.g., websites for financial services or news), how
can we identify typical and atypical practices? A bank
website that collects users’ health information, for ex-
ample, would be atypical. When an atypical practice is
found, when should it be a cause for concern (or com-
mendation)? Can we recommend websites in a given
sector based on an Internet user’s expressed privacy
preferences?
• Identifying trends in privacy practices: The activities
that Internet users perform online continue to evolve,
and with that evolution the mechanisms for collect-
ing, using, and sharing their data are subject to change.
The Internet of Things (IoT) provides a potent exam-
ple, as sensors collect and share progressively larger
amounts of sensitive data. Finding trends in privacy
practices will help guide policy regulators to focus
their attention on emerging issues.
5. Conclusion
We have described progress toward making privacy
policies usable, for the benefit of Internet users, regulators,
and policymakers. Additionally, we have presented a rich
set of challenges for the research community, engaging ef-
forts in crowdsourcing, natural language processing, and
machine learning. The corpus of privacy policy annotations
introduced in this paper could also provide a basis for one
or more competitions in this area.
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